Malware detection and analysis via layered annotative execution by Yin, Heng
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
2009 
Malware detection and analysis via layered annotative execution 
Heng Yin 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the Computer Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Yin, Heng, "Malware detection and analysis via layered annotative execution" (2009). Dissertations, 
Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539623553. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-qrnf-n760 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
Malware Detection and Analysis via Layered Annotative 
Execution 
Heng Yin 
Yichang, Hubei Province, China 
Master of Engineering, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, 2002 
Bachelor of Science, Huar-hong University of Science and Technology, 1999 
A Dissertation presented to the Graduate 
of the College of William and Mary in Candidacy for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Computer Science 
The College of William and Mary 
August, 2009 
APPROVAL PAGE 
This Dissertation is submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Heng Yin 
Approved by the Committee, July 2009 
Committee Chair 
Dr. Raining Wang 
The College of William and Mary 
Dr. Dawn Song (Co-advisor) 
Computer Science Division 
?27-ia Beckeley 
Dr. Phil Kearns 
Computer Science Department 
The College of William and Mary 
©hen~ 
Computer Science Department 
The College of William and Mary 
Dr. Qun Li 
Computer Science Department 
The College of William and Mary 
ABSTRACT PAGE 
Malicious software (i.e., malware) has become a severe threat to interconnected computer 
systems for decades and has caused billions of dollars damages each year. A large volume 
of new malware samples are discovered daily. Even worse, malware is rapidly evolving to 
be more sophisticated and evasive to strike against current malware analysis and defense 
systems. This dissertation takes a root-cause oriented approach to the problem of auto-
matic malware detection and analysis. In this approach, we aim to capture the intrinsic 
natures of malicious behaviors, rather than the external symptoms of existing attacks. 
We propose a new architecture for binary code analysis, which is called whole-system 
out-of-the-box fine-grained dynamic binary analysis, to address the common challenges 
in malware detection and analysis. To realize this architecture, we build a unified and 
extensible analysis platform, codenamed TEMU. We propose a core technique for fine-
grained dynamic binary analysis, called layered annotative execution, and implement this 
technique in TEMU. Then on the basis of TEMU, we have proposed and built a series 
of novel techniques for automatic malware detection and analysis. For postmortem mal-
ware analysis, we have developed Renovo, Panorama, HookFinder, and MineSweeper, for 
detecting and analyzing various aspects of malware. For proactive malware detection, we 
have built HookScout as a proactive hook detection system. These techniques capture 
intrinsic characteristics of malware and thus are well suited for dealing with new malware 
samples and attack mechanisms. 
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Execution 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Malicious software, i.e., malware, is a generic terminology for software with malicious 
intents. It includes many categories, such as virus, spyware, rootkits, trojan horses, back-
door, bats, etc. Malware has become a severe threat to interconnected computer systems 
for decades. Some study shows that malware causes billions of dollars financial losses 
annually [54]. The situation is becoming worse, because malware writers are profit driven. 
The attackers have incentives to rapidly develop large number of new malware samples 
and new variants (in the order of thousands or even more per day). To frustrate malware 
detection analysis, the attackers are actively striving for more and more sophisticated and 
stealthy attack techniques. 
In response to the break-neck speed of malware development and innovation, the anti-
malware community needs effective and efficient automatic malware detection and analysis 
techniques. Therefore, the focus of this dissertation is on automatic malware detection 
and analysis. 
2 
3 
1.1 Background: Malware Detection and Analysis 
Unfortunately, the current techniques for mal ware detection and analysis is far from 
being satisfactory. This section gives a survey of current techniques and their limitations. 
1.1.1 Current Malware Detection Techniques 
The current malware detection techniques fall into two categories: signature based and 
behavior based approaches. Signature based malware detection has been in use for years 
to scan files on disk and even memory for known signatures. Although semantic-aware 
signature checking [19] improves its resilience to polymorphic and metamorphic variants, 
the inherent limitation of the signature based approach is its incapability of detecting 
previously unseen malware instances. Its usefulness is also limited by the rootkits that 
hide files on disk and, as demonstrated in Shadow Walker [14], may even hide malware 
footprints in memory. 
Behavior based malware detection identifies malicious programs by observing their 
behaviors and system states (i.e., detection points). By recognizing deviations from "nor-
mal" system states and behaviors, behavior based detection may identify entire classes 
of malware, including previously unseen instances. There are a variety of detections that 
examine different detection points. Strider GateKeeper [97] checks auto-start extensibility 
points in the registry to determine surreptitious restart-surviving behaviors. VICE [13] 
and System Virginity Verifier [74] search for various hooks that are usually used by rootk-
its and the other malware. Behavior based detection can be defeated, either by exploring 
stealthier methods to evade the known detection points, or by providing misleading infor-
mation to cheat detection tools. More fundamentally, these detection policies are often 
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derived from heuristics to detect known attack symptoms. If attackers identify new ways 
to achieve the same malicious goal and avoid exhibiting these symptoms, they can com-
pletely evade these detection policies. 
1.1.2 Current Malware Analysis Techniques 
The current malware analysis techniques fall into two categories: static analysis and 
dynamic analysis. Common static analysis techniques, such as disassembler tools [48], 
can be easily defeated by various anti-analysis techniques, such as code packing [93], anti 
debugging [2], control-flow obfuscation [51], and others. 
Dynamic analysis can cope with these anti-analysis techniques. Common dynamic 
analysis techniques, such as CWSandbox [99], NormanSandbox [4], and Anubis [3], run the 
malicious code in a special environment, such as a virtual machine or an emulator, and then 
observe its interaction with the environment by monitoring important system calls and API 
calls. However, they have many significant limitations: 1) they cannot deal with kernel 
malware and dynamically generated code; 2) they cannot monitor malware's behavior in 
a fine-grained manner (e.g., monitoring accesses to registers and memory); 3) they cannot 
uncover hidden behaviors that only are exhibited under certain conditions; 4) they cannot 
reason about the inner-working of malware. Some research efforts [29, 57, 95, 98]) have 
been made to address some of these limitations, or to analyze specific kinds of malware. 
However, none of them can address the problem of malware analysis from a holistic view, 
and thus none of them can serve as a systematic and generic solution to the problem of 
automatic malware analysis. 
5 
1.2 Dissertation Overview 
At a high level, we take a mot-cause oriented approach to the research of automatic 
malware detection and analysis. We aim to capture intrinsic natures of malicious behav-
iors, rather than external symptoms of existing attacks. Since the intrinsic natures stem 
deeply from malicious intents, detection and analysis techniques based on these intrinsic 
natures would be much more difficult to evade and thwart. Moreover, these techniques 
would be used to deal with entire classes of malicious behaviors effectively. 
To realize this approach, we propose a new architecture for malware detection and 
analysis, called whole-system out-of-the-box fine-grained dynamic binary analysis. The 
basic idea to run an entire operating system (e.g., Windows) inside a whole-system em-
ulator, and then run the binary code in this emulated environment. During execution 
of the binary code, we monitor and analyze its behaviors in a fine-grained manner (i.e., 
at instruction level), completely from outside (within the emulator). we propose a core 
technique, namely layered annotative execution, as a Swiss army knife, to fine-grained bi-
nary code analysis. Essentially, during the execution of each instruction in the emulated 
system, depending on the instruction semantics and the analysis purpose, we can anno-
tate certain memory locations or CPU registers or update existing annotations. This is a 
layered approach, because we can layer extra analysis process on top of the existing anal-
ysis to extract more insightful results. We implement the new architecture and the core 
technique into a generic dynamic binary analysis platform, code-named TEMU. TEMU is 
based on an open-source whole system emulator, QEMU [8]. 
On the basis of TEMU, we further propose a series of new techniques to detect and 
analyze several different aspects of malicious behaviors, and implement these techniques in 
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form of TEMU plugins. These techniques can be classified into two categories: postmortem 
malware detection and analysis and proactive malware detection. 
In the scenario of postmortem malware detection and analysis, we aim to detect and 
analyze malicious behaviors, given an unknown and likely malicious binary program. This 
suspicious program can be collected through honeypots, computer forensics of compro-
mised systems, and underground channels. By analyzing this unknown program, we 
identify its malicious behaviors and extract attack mechanisms. Then we can rely on 
the an<=:tlysis results to build up proper defense, such as creating detection signatures and 
updating detection policies. Specifically, we developed Renovo to capture intrinsic nature 
of code unpacking behavior for extracting unpacked code and data; we built Panorama 
to characterize abnormal information access and processing behavior of privacy-breaching 
malware; we implemented MineSweeper to uncover hidden behaviors and identify trigger 
conditions; and we developed HookFinder to identify and understand malware's hooking 
behaviors. 
In the scenario of proactive mal ware detection, we aim to generate a thorough detection 
policy in advance, in order to detect an entire class of attacks, even before a new attack 
breaks out. In this case, the object to be analyzed is the operating system to be protected. 
In particular, we consider how to automatically generate a hook detection policy, by 
analyzing a given operating system. To this end, we built HookScout as a proactive hook 
detection tool. 
In summary, we made the following contributions in this dissertation: 
• A root-cause oriented approach to the problem of automatic malware detection and 
analysis. 
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• A new system architecture, called whole-system out-of-the box fine-grained dynamic 
binary analysis. 
• A core technique, namely layered annotative execution for fine-grained dynamic 
binary analysis. 
• A unified and extensible analysis platform, code-named TEMU, to realize the new 
architecture and the core technique. 
• A series of new techniques for detecting and analyzing various aspects of malware. 
1.3 Dissertation Organization 
In the remainder of this dissertation, we present the design and implementation of 
TEMU in Chapter 2. We then present a series of techniques for postmortem malware 
analysis in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we describe techniques for proactive malware detec-
tion. In Chapter 5, we discuss the limitations of our approach and current implementation, 
and we propose potential enhancements as future work. Chapter 6 surveys related work. 
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation. 
Chapter 2 
Dynamic Binary Analysis 
Platform 
In this chapter, we present the design and implementation of TEMU, a unified and 
extensible dynamic binary analysis platform. 
2.1 Architecture 
We propose a new architecture for dynamic binary analysis, called whole-system out-
of-the-box fine-grained dynamic binary analysis. The basic idea to run an entire operating 
system (including common applications) inside a whole-system emulator, execute the bi-
nary code of interest in this emulated environment, and then observe and analyze the 
behaviors of this binary code from the emulator. This new architecture is motivated by 
the following considerations: 
• Dynamic analysis. Malware is often equipped with various code obfuscation tech-
niques, making pure static analysis extremely difficult. By actually executing the 
8 
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malware, dynamic analysis can overcome these code obfuscation techniques. This is 
because no matter what code obfuscation methods the malware is equipped with, as 
long as the malware exhibits the malicious behaviors during the dynamic analysis, 
we can observe and analyze these malicious behaviors. 
• Whole-system view. A whole-system emulator presents us a whole-system view. 
The whole-system view enables us to analyze the operating system kernel and inter-
actions between multiple processes. In contrast, many other binary analysis tools 
(e.g., Valgrind [59], DynamoRIO [26], Pin [52]) only provide a local view (i.e., a 
view of a single user-mode process). This is particularly important for analyzing 
malicious code, because many attacks involve multiple processes, and kernel attacks 
such as rootkits have become increasingly popular. 
• Out-of-the-box approach. We perform analysis completely outside the execution 
environment. This out-of-the-box approach provides excellent isolation and good 
transparency. It is more difficult for malware to detect the presence of analysis 
environment and interfere with analysis results. 
• Fine-grained analysis. Many analyses require fine-grained instrumentation (i.e., 
at instruction level) on binary code. By dynamically translating the emulated code, 
the whole-system emulator enables fine-grained instrumentation. 
We developed a system called TEMU to implement this new architecture. Figure 2.1 
illustrates the architecture of TEMU. TEMU provides several key functionalities: 
• OS awareness. The whole-system emulator only provides the hardware-level view 
of the emulated system, whereas we need a OS-level view to get meaningful analysis 
10 
Emulated System 
Engine 
Figure 2.1: Architecture of TEMU 
results. Therefore, we need a mechanism that can extract the OS-level semantics 
from the emulated system. For example, we need to know what process is currently 
running and what module an instruction comes from. To this end, we build the 
semantics extractor to extract OS-level semantics information from the emulated 
system. 
• Core analysis technique. Many program analysis techniques require annotating 
data values according to semantics of each executed instruction. We propose a 
generic analysis technique, called layered annotative execution, and implement it in 
the annotative execution engine. 
• Plug-in architecture. We need to provide a well-designed programming interface 
(i.e., API) for users to implement their own plugins on TEMU to perform their 
customized analysis. Such an interface can hide unnecessary details from users and 
reuse the common functionalities. 
We implemented TEMU in Linux, based on an open-source whole-system emulator, 
QEMU [8]. At the time of writing, TEMU can be used to analyze binary code in Win-
11 
dows 2000, Windows XP, and Linux systems. Below we describe these three components 
respectively. 
2.2 Semantics Extractor 
The semantics extractor is responsible for extracting OS-level semantics information of 
the emulated system, including process, module, thread, symbol information, and function 
call context. 
2.2.1 Process and Module Information 
For the current execution instruction, we need to know which process, thread and 
module this instruction comes from. In some cases, instructions may be dynamically 
generated and executed on the heap. 
Maintaining a mapping between addresses in memory and modules requires informa-
tion from the guest operating system. We use two different approaches to extract process 
and module information for Windows and Linux. 
For Windows, we have developed a kernel module called module notifier. We load this 
module into the guest operating system to collect the updated memory map information. 
The module notifier registers two callback routines. The first callback routine is invoked 
whenever a process is created or deleted. The second callback routine is called whenever 
a new module is loaded and gathers the address range in the virtual memory that the new 
module occupies. In addition, the module notifier obtains the value of the CR3 register for 
each process. As the CR3 register contains the physical address of the page table of the 
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current process, it is different (and unique) for each process. All the information described 
above is passed on to TEMU through a predefined I/0 port. 
For Linux, we can directly read process and module information from outside, because 
we know the relevant kernel data structures, and the addresses of relevant symbols are also 
exported in the system. map file. In order to maintain the process and module information 
during execution, we hook several kernel functions, such as do_fork and do_exec. 
2.2.2 Thread Information 
For windows, we also obtain the current thread information to support analysis of 
multi-threaded applications and the OS kernel. It is fairly straightforward, because the 
data structure of the current thread is mapped into a well-known virtual address in Win-
dows. Currently, we do not obtain thread information for Linux and may implement it in 
future versions. 
2.2.3 Symbol Information 
Given a binary module, we also parse its header information in memory and extract 
the exported symbol names and offsets. After we determine the locations of all modules, 
we can determine the absolute address of each symbol by adding the base address of 
the module and its offset. This feature is very useful, because all windows APis and 
kernel APis are exported by their hosting modules. The symbol information conveys 
important semantics information, because from a function name, we are able to determine 
what purpose this function is used for, what input arguments it takes, and what output 
arguments and return value it generates. Moreover, the symbol information makes it more 
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convenient to hook a function-instead of giving the actual address of a function, we can 
specify its module name and function name. Then TEMU will automatically map the 
actual address of the function for the user. In the current implementation, TEMU is able 
to parse memory images of PE and ELF binary modules. 
2.2.4 Function Call Context 
It is important, in many cases, to determine if some behavior executed in system or 
library code is actually performed on behalf of the program under analysis. In other words, 
we often need to tell if certain behavior is performed under the function call context of 
the program of interest. 
We use the following observation to identify taint propagation that is performed by 
trusted system modules on behalf of the malware: Whenever the malicious code calls a 
trusted function to propagate tainted data, the value of the stack pointer at the time of 
the function call must be greater than the value of the stack pointer at the time when the 
tainted data is actually propagated. This is because one or more stack frames have to be 
pushed onto the stack when making function calls, and the stack grows toward smaller 
addresses on the x86 architecture. 
Based on our observation, we use the following approach to identify the case when 
trusted functions propagate tainted values on behalf of the code under analysis: Whenever 
the execution jumps into the code under analysis (or code derived from it), we record the 
current value of the stack pointer, together with the current thread identifier. When 
executing jumps out of this code, we check whether there is a recorded stack pointer for 
the current thread identifier, and if so, whether this value is smaller than the current stack 
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pointer. If this is the case, we remove the record as the code is not on the stack anymore. 
Whenever an interesting behavior is observed, we check whether there is a recorded stack 
pointer under the current thread identifier. If so, we consider this tainted data being 
propagated by the code under analysis. 
2.3 Annotative Execution Engine 
We propose a generic technique for dynamic binary code analysis, namely layered 
annotative execution. During the execution of each instruction, depending on the instruc-
tion semantics, we can annotate the operands of this instruction or update the existing 
annotations. 
We use a shadow memory to store and manage the annotations of each byte of the 
physical memory and CPU registers and flags. To support tracking memory being swapped 
in and out, we also have shadow memory for the hard disks. The shadow memory is 
organized in a page-table-like structure to ensure efficient memory usage. With the shadow 
memory for the hard disks, the system can continue to track the annotations that have 
been swapped out. 
We can perform annotative execution in a variety of ways. The most basic analysis is 
called shadow flag analysis, in which we may simply annotate certain memory locations or 
registers to be dirty or clean. A more advanced analysis is called taint analysis, in which we 
not only annotate certain memory locations and registers to be tainted, but also keep track 
of taint propagation. The most advanced analysis is called symbolic execution, in which we 
not only mark certain inputs (i.e, memory locations or registers) as tainted, but assign a 
meaningful symbol to these inputs. Then during taint propagation, we associate symbolic 
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Figure 2.2: A Layered Approach for Annotative Execution 
expressions to the tainted memory locations and registers. These symbolic expressions 
indicate how these variables are calculated from the symbolic inputs. Apparently, this is 
a layered approach: one analysis mechanism is built on top of another to perform more 
advanced analysis, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
2.3.1 Shadow Flag Analysis 
Shadow flag analysis is the most basic analysis in this layered architecture. Basically, 
depending on the execution context and the semantics of the current instruction, we 
determine to mark certain memory or register to be dirty or clean. Later, we can check 
the status of memory and registers, to determine which memory regions and registers are 
marked as dirty. To minimize the storage consumption of shadow memory, we only need 
to maintain the states of dirty memory regions and registers, and manage the states in a 
page-table-like structure. 
2. 3. 2 Taint Analysis 
Our dynamic taint analysis is similar in spirit to a number of previous systems [18, 
21, 61, 83]. However, since our goal is to enable whole-system fine-grained taint analysis, 
our design and implementation is the most complete. For example, previous approaches 
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either operate on a single process only [61,83], or they cannot deal with memory swapping 
and disks [18, 21]. 
A TEMU plugin is responsible to introduce taint sources into the system. TEMU 
supports taint input from hardware, such as the keyboard, network interface, and hard 
disk. TEMU also supports tainting a high-level abstract data object (e.g. the output of a 
function call, or a data structure in a specific application or the OS kernel). 
After a data source is tainted, we need to monitor each CPU instruction and DMA 
operation that manipulates this data in order to determine how the taint propagates. For 
data movement instructions and DMA operations, the destination will be tainted if and 
only if the source is tainted. For arithmetic instructions, the result will be tainted if and 
only if any byte of the operands is tainted. We also handle the following special situations. 
Some instructions or instruction sequences always produce the same results, indepen-
dent of the values of their operands. A good example is the instruction "xor eax, eax" 
that commonly appears in IA-32 programs as a compiler idiom. After executing this in-
struction, the value of eax is always zero, regardless of its original value. We recognize a 
number of such special cases and untaint the result. 
A tainted input may be used as an index to access an entry of a table. The taint 
propagation policy above will not propagate taint to the destination, because the value 
that is actually read is untainted. Unfortunately, such table lookup operations appear 
frequently, such as for Unicode/ ASCII conversion in Windows. Thus, we augment our 
propagation policy with the following rule: if any byte used to calculate the address of 
a memory locations is tainted, then, the result of a memory read using this address is 
tainted as well. 
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2.3.3 Symbolic Execution 
Symbolic execution gives abstract interpretations of how certain values are processed 
on both data plane and control plane. On the data plane, symbolic execution allows 
registers and memory locations to contain symbolic expressions in addition to concrete 
values. Thus, a value in a register may be an expression such as X + Y where X and 
Y are symbolic variables. Consider a small program in Figure 2.3. After execution, we 
produce a symbolic expression for mem [10], which is mem [10] = y*3+5. This symbolic 
expression abstractly interprets how the content in this memory location is calculated 
from the relevant symbolic inputs on the data plane. 
L1: z = 10; 
L2: X = 2· 
' 
L3: X = Y*3; 
L4: z = x+4; 
L5: k z+1; 
L6: if (z<10) 
L7: mem[10] = k· 
' 
Figure 2.3: A Simple Symbolic Program 
On the control plane, symbolic execution generates a path predicate, describing the 
constraints on the symbolic inputs need to satisfy for the program execution to go down 
that path. In the above example, the if statement z < 10 has to be true for the mem [10] 
to be assigned a new value. The symbolic execution can give us a path predicate y < 
2, which abstractly describes what condition has to be satisfied in order to perform the 
assignment operation on L 7. 
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When certain conditions are not satisfied, behaviors depending on these conditions will 
not be exhibited. In the above example, if the actual value of y is 3, then the if statement 
z<10 will not be true, and the operation on L7 will not be executed. To uncover the 
hidden behaviors, for each control flow decision that depends on symbolic inputs, we will 
determine which branches are feasible and try to explore all the feasible execution paths. 
More precisely, for each branch, we extract a symbolic expression as the path predicate, 
and use a theorem prover to determine if the path predicate can be true. In the above 
example, we will be able to explore both branches for the if statement on L6, because we 
determine the path predicate can be either true or false. Thus, we will be able to uncover 
the memory assignment on L 7. 
During symbolic execution, for each instruction, we need to determine if it should 
be executed symbolically. If so, we enqueue this instruction and its operands into the 
symbolic machine. In consequence, the instructions and states in the symbolic machine 
form a symbolic program. Then if we want to query the symbolic expression and path 
predicate of a symbol, we extract formulas from the symbolic program. In addition, 
whenever a control flow decision is dependent of a symbolic variable, we attempt to explore 
all feasible directions. 
2.3.3.1 Generate Symbolic Program 
An instruction can be executed concretely iff all operands of the instruction are con-
crete. Thus, deciding whether an instruction should be executed concretely or symbolically 
requires information about which data in the system is concrete and which is symbolic. 
Recall that the shadow memory associated with registers and memory indicates the status 
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of each byte. A symbolic byte is marked as tainted. Thus, to determine if an instruction 
needs to be executed symbolically, we just need to check if any of its operands is tainted. 
If so, we perform symbolic execution, and mark the destination operand as tainted, just 
like normal taint propagation. Otherwise, we execute this instruction concretely. 
Mixed execution means that many instructions will be executed concretely and never 
be executed on the symbolic machine. Therefore, if an instruction to be symbolically 
executed has any concrete operands, we must update those concrete values inside the 
symbolic machine. 
Ideally, during symbolic execution, we would like to generate symbolic expressions and 
path predicates on the fly. However, this naive approach would incur unacceptable per-
formance overhead at runtime. To optimize the performance, we perform "lazy symbolic 
execution". Its basic idea is to quickly perform as few operations as possible to guar-
antee fast runtime performance, and maintain the enough information for post analysis. 
Specifically, for each instruction that need to be executed symbolically, we enqueue that 
instruction, along with the relevant machine states (including all operands and other re-
lated memory and register states) into our symbolic machine. Then we quickly mark the 
destination operand as symbolic by checking the source operands. This strategy enables 
fast runtime performance. In consequence, the instructions and states in the symbolic 
machine form a symbolic program, just like the one in Figure 2.3. 
2.3.3.2 Extract Symbolic Formulas 
We take the following steps to extract a symbolic formula for a symbol from the 
symbolic program. First, we perform dynamic slicing on the symbolic program. This 
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step removes the instructions that the symbol does not depend upon. After this step, 
the symbolic program will be reduced tremendously. Then we generate one expression 
by substituting intermediate symbols with their right-hand-side expressions. At last, we 
perform constant folding to further simplify the expression. Still use the program in 
Figure 2.3 as an example. To get the symbolic expression for mem [10], we perform dynamic 
slicing first. It would remove the instructions on Ll and L2. Then we perform symbol 
substitution, and we get a formula like below: 
mem [10] y*3+1+4 
Then we perform constant folding on it, and finally get: 
mem[10] y*3+5 
2.3.3.3 Explore Multiple Execution Paths 
When executing a conditional jump instruction that depends on a symbolic condition, 
we attempt to explore all feasible paths. To determine if a path is feasible, we generate the 
path predicate for that path, and ask the Solver if this path predicate is satisfiable. The 
Solver is a theorem prover or decision procedure, which performs reasoning on symbolic 
formulas. TEMU is extensible; we can plug in any Solver appropriate, and our system thus 
can automatically benefit from any new progress on decision procedures, etc. Currently 
in our implementation, we use STP as the Solver [34, 35]. 
A satisfiable path predicate means a feasible path. We need to decide which feasible 
direction needs to be explored now. Thus, we need an algorithm to prioritize the paths in 
the malicious code. We may employ different heuristics to decide which path to pick from 
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the set of feasible paths. For example, it can use breadth-first search, depth-first search, 
and other strategies. In our approach, our strategy is to explore as many conditional jumps 
which depend upon abstract symbols as possible. Thus, we take a BFS like approach. 
Once we decide which direction to explore, we save the state of the emulated system, 
and then make the system execution go to that direction by changing the EIP register. 
Later, if we want to explore the other direction, we can simply restore the state and 
start execution from that point. More specifically, the saved state includes the states of 
whole emulated machine (such as registers, memory, and I/0 devices), the state of shadow 
memory in TEMU, and the symbolic program. The size of this entire state can be large. 
We can employ various compression techniques to reduce the size. For example, we can 
save the relative state changes to an initial state, instead of the absolute state. Then we 
can perform common compression methods on the relative state to further reduce its size. 
The functionality of state saving and restoring enables a distributed architecture for 
malware analysis. It may be still time-consuming to analyze a complex and big malware 
sample, in terms of the number of branches that depend upon symbolic inputs. A central-
ized controller may disseminate different saved states to multiple working nodes, such that 
they can explore multiple different execution paths in parallel. This architecture would 
significantly reduce the overall analysis time for a malware sample. 
Moser et al. also build a malware analysis system that is capable of exploring multiple 
execution path [57]. In comparison, we independently propose and develop our system, as 
a more comprehensive solution to this problem. First, TEMU maintains path predicates 
with bit-level accuracy and can handle non-linear path constraints, whereas their system 
can only handle linear constraints. Second, their system saves and restores states for a 
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specific process, assuming malware is only within one process, while our system handles 
whole-system states and thus can cope with malware that involves kernel code and multiple 
processes. 
2.4 TEMU APis 
In order for users to make use of the functionalities provided by TEMU, we define a set 
of functions and callbacks. By using this interface, users can implement their own plugins 
and load them into TEMU at runtime to perform analysis. Currently, TEMU provides 
the following functionalities: 
• Query and set the value of a memory cell or a CPU register. 
• Query and set the taint information of memory or registers. 
• Register a hook to a function at its entry and exit, and remove a hook. TEMU 
plugins can use this interface to monitor both user and kernel functions. 
• Query OS-level semantics information, such as the current process, module, and 
thread. 
• Save and load the emulated system state. This interface helps to switch between 
different machine states for more efficient analysis. For example, this interface makes 
multiple path exploration more efficient, because we can save a state for a specific 
branch point and explore one path, and then load this state to explore the other 
path without restarting the program execution. 
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TEMU defines callbacks for various events, including (1) the entry and exit of a basic 
block; (2) the entry and exit of an instruction; (3) when taint is propagating; ( 4) when 
a memory is read or write; (5) when a register is read or written to; (6) hardware events 
such as network and disk inputs and outputs. 
Chapter 3 
Postmortem Malware Analysis 
In postmortem malware detection and analysis, we aim to detect and analyze malicious 
behaviors, given an unknown and likely malicious binary program. By analyzing this 
unknown program, we identify its malicious behaviors and extract attack mechanisms. 
Then we can rely on the analysis results to build up proper defense, such as creating 
detection signatures and updating detection policies. In this chapter, we will discuss four 
techniques for analyzing four different aspects of mal ware. In Section 3.1, we will present 
Renovo for extracting unpacked code and data from packed malicious code. In Section 3.2, 
we will discuss Panorama for characterizing abnormal information access and processing 
behavior of privacy-breaching malware. In Section 3.3, we will present HookFinder for 
identifying and understanding malware's hooking behaviors. Finally, in Section 3.4, we 
will present MineSweeper as a technique to uncover hidden behaviors and identify trigger 
conditions. 
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Jumping to OEP 
To thwart static malware analysis, malware writers usually have their programs heavy-
armored with various code obfuscation techniques. Such techniques include binary and 
source code obfuscation [9,51], control-flow obfuscation [45], instruction virtualization [87], 
and binary code packing [72]. Here, we focus on identifying and extracting the hidden code 
generated using binary code packing, one of the most common code obfuscation methods. 
Code packing transforms a program into a packed program by compressing or encrypting 
the original code and data into packed data and associating it with a restoration routine. 
A restoration routine is a piece of code for recovering the original code and data as well 
as setting an execution context to the original code when the packed program is executed. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates how a packed program is executed. This technique is available as 
commercial products [5, 10, 63, 79, 86] and open-source tools. According to the anti-virus 
(AV) program test results of AV-Test GmbH [11], the detection rates of 8 major AV 
programs varied from 10% to 80% when known malware binaries have been packed. 
Various tools have been developed to identify and extract the hidden code in packed 
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executables. Commonly known tools such as PEiD [66] employ a simple pattern matching 
approach. These tools check an executable with a signature database to determine what 
kind of packing tool is used to create the executable. Then, using a priori knowledge 
about the packing tool, it is possible to extract the hidden binary from the executable [92]. 
Although this approach is usually fast and accurate for known packing tools, it is unable 
to detect novel and modified packing techniques. For example, a variant of the Bagle 
worm employed its own compression engine which is not known to the public [42]. In fact, 
by modifying the open source anti-reverse engineering tools like YodaProtector [103], it 
is easy for malware writers to implement new anti-reverse engineering algorithms and 
tricks. 
Some tools attempt to solve this problem in a more generic way. Universal PE Un-
packer [23] and PolyUnpack [72] make use of dynamic analysis to extract packed binaries 
and find the OEP (i.e., Original Entry Point). They either rely on some heuristics or 
require disassembling the packed program. However, heuristics about packed code can fail 
in many cases and can be easily evaded. Correctly disassembling a binary program itself 
is challenging and error-prone, as demonstrated in [58]. To overcome the disassembly 
challenge required for packed code extraction, a tool like PolyUnpack needs to perform a 
series of static and dynamic analysis which leads to performance overhead and inaccuracy. 
Problem Statement. Given an unknown binary program, we want to automatically 
detect if it exhibits code packing behavior, and if so, extract unpacked code and data from 
the packed program. We aim to capture the intrinsic nature of code unpacking behavior, 
which is independent of the packing techniques applied on the programs. By doing so, 
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we can solve this problem in the most generic way, overcoming the limitations of previous 
approaches. 
3.1.2 Approach Overview and System Implementation 
We capture the following intrinsic nature of code unpacking behavior: no matter what 
packing methods or how many hidden layers are applied, the original program code and 
data should eventually be present in memory to be executed, and also the instruction 
pointer should jump to the OEP of the restored program code which has been written in 
memory at run-time. Taking advantage of this inevitable nature of packed executables, we 
propose a technique to dynamically extract the hidden original code and the OEP from 
the packed executable by examining whether the current instruction has been generated 
at run-time, after the program binary was loaded. For this purpose, we monitor if the 
instruction pointer jumps to the memory region which has been written after the program 
start-up. When a program is loaded in memory, we generate a memory map and initialize 
the map as clean. Whenever the program performs a memory write instruction, e.g., mov 
%eax, [%edi] and push %eax, we mark the corresponding destination memory region 
as dirty, which means it is newly generated. Meanwhile, when the instruction pointer 
jumps to one of these newly-generated regions, we determine that there is a hidden layer 
hiding the original program code, and identify the newly-generated memory regions to 
contain the hidden code and data, and the address pointed by the instruction pointer as 
the original entry point (OEP). To handle the possible hidden layers that may appear 
later on, we initialize the memory map as clean again, after storing all the information 
extracted from the current hidden layer. Then, we repeat the same procedure until the 
Executable Binary 
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Emulated Environment 
Memory 
Write 
~~ 
'---------' 
Figure 3.2: Renovo Overview 
time-out. Figure 3.2 illustrates the overview of this approach. 
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Extracted Hidden Code 
with the OEP 
We implement Renovo, on top of TEMU, to automatically identify packed executables 
and extract their hidden code. Specifically, I make use of shadow flag analysis mechanism 
in layered annotative execution provided by TEMU. That is, Renovo observes the program 
execution in the emulated environment. Initially, the entire shadow memory is set as clean. 
In this case, the page table of the shadow memory is empty. During program execution, 
Renovo instruments memory writes within the observed process, and annotate the written 
memory regions as dirty. Meanwhile, it queries the shadow memory, and checks if any 
byte of the memory region that the current instruction occupies is dirty. If so, it can 
determine the instruction has been newly generated. 
When checking newly generated instructions, we do not have to check every instruction. 
To optimize the performance, we check every basic block in the observed process. A basic 
block is a sequence of instructions with only one entry and one exit. Thus a basic block 
is a contiguous code region. At the block entry, we record its address. Then at the block 
exit, we check if there is any dirty memory locations within the region covering this block. 
If so, this block entry is the OEP, and we dump the pages containing dirty memory bytes. 
In order to extract hidden code from packed executables with multiple hidden layers, 
we clean the dirty states in the shadow memory, and then repeat the extraction proce-
Tool Size Renovo UUnP Poly Unpack 
(KB) result time result time result 
(sec) (sec) 
None 68 no N/A no N/A no 
Armadillo 564 error 44 error 1 part 
A SPack 53 yes 35 yes 3 part 
ASProtect 153 yes 48 error 6 yes 
FSG 46 yes 38 yes 3 yes 
MEW 44 yes 36 yes 139 yes 
MoleBox 108 yes 47 error 242 no 
Morphine 72 yes 36 yes 1 yes 
Obsidium 143 error 61 error 1 no 
PECompact 49 yes 37 error 2 no 
Themida(w/ VM) 1342 part 60 no 9 timeout 
Themida(w /o VM) 1067 yes 70 error 10 timeout 
UPX 
UPXS 
WinUPack 
YodaProtector 
Remark: 
no 
yes 
part 
timeout 
error 
47 yes 35 yes 3 yes 
47 yes 37 yes 4 yes 
44 yes 38 error 12 part 
64 yes 36 error 1 part 
A tool identified a binary as not being packed. 
A tool extracted the whole original notepad binary. 
A tool identified an incorrect entry point or could only 
extract parts of the original binary. 
A tool did not terminate within the time-out period of 
30 minutes. 
A tool encountered errors or terminated prematurely. 
Table 3.1: Extracting Hidden Code in Synthetic Samples 
time 
(sec) 
N/A 
1617 
181 
62 
92 
739 
757 
174 
457 
39 
1800 
1800 
94 
92 
33 
62 
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dure. Note that determining whether a program has hidden code or not is an undecidable 
problem [72]. Thus, we introduce a configurable time-out parameter into the system. If 
we do not observe any hidden code being executed within this time-out, we terminate the 
extraction procedure. In the experiments, we set this parameter to be 4 minutes. 
3.1.3 Evaluation 
We describe two experiments and present the evaluation results, demonstrating that 
Renovo is an accurate and practical solution for extracting the original hidden code of 
packed executables. 
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3.1.3.1 Extracting from Synthetic Samples 
To verify that Renovo generates accurate results, we have tested Renovo and two 
other extraction techniques, Universal PE Unpacker [23] and PolyUnpack [72], against the 
synthetic sample programs generated by using 14 different packing tools. These tools apply 
different packing techniques as well as encryption, code obfuscation, debugger detection, 
and instruction virtualization to thwart reverse engineering. 
We use Microsoft notepad as an original binary to generate synthetic packed program 
samples. For all tools but Themida [87], the samples are created using the tools' default 
configuration. In the case of Themida, we generated two samples with slightly different 
configurations: one with instruction virtualization ("VM option") and one without it. 
Other than that, both options still use the same compression, encryption, and other 
techniques to protect the program from reverse engineering. We tested and ensured that 
none of these synthetic samples contains the binary string found in the . text section of 
the original notepad program. With the knowledge that these packing tools usually restore 
and execute the original binary instructions at run-time, we could verify the correctness of 
our extraction technique by comparing the extracted hidden code regions with the . text 
section of the original binary. 
As shown in Table 3.1, Renovo fully extracted the original binaries processed by all but 
3 packing tools, which are Armadillo, Obsidium, and Themida( w / VM). But in the first 
two cases, the samples terminated before reaching the original program code, likely because 
the executables are not compatible with the Renovo's emulation engine. Nevertheless, 
Renovo still identified these two samples as packed executables because it successfully 
extracted hidden code and data from several initial hidden layers, which seem to be its 
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restoration routines. In the case of a sample generated using Themida(w I VM), Renovo 
extracted some hidden regions which do not match the original notepad binary. We believe 
this is the VM virtualization code equivalent to the original notepad instructions since we 
successfully extracted those from a sample generated using Themida( w I o VM). 
Although UUnP requires a priori knowledge about the possible range of the OEP, 
it can run automatically without such input from a user. By default, it assumes that 
the OEP locates in the first program segmentation as identified by IDAPro and uses this 
contiguous memory segmentation as the possible range of the OEP. We ran UUnP using 
this default heuristic and found UUnP successfully extract the original notepad code from 
6 out of 15 samples (Table 3.1). It failed on the sample generated by Themida( w I VM) as 
the executable detected the presence ofiDA's debugger. For the rest of the samples, UUnP 
encountered the exception handler routine and was unable to proceed to later execution 
steps. Nevertheless, note that UUnP is very efficient as it can extract most hidden code 
in less than 10 seconds. 
We obtained the analysis results of PolyUnpack [72] by submitting samples to the 
Malfease website [53] of which PolyUnpack operates as its sub-module. We also asked 
the PolyUnpack authors to run our samples against a version of PolyUnpack that handles 
some forms of structured exception handling in addition to the functionalities presented 
on the Malfease website. 
3.1.3.2 Extracting from Malware Samples 
In this experiment, we test Renovo with the real malware samples which are protected 
by known and unknown packing techniques. We also used Universal PE Unpacker (UUnP) 
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and PolyUnpack for comparison analysis like in the previous experiment. 
To select the most-likely packed executables, we briefly examined the malware samples 
provided by Korea Information Security Agency (KISA) using PEiD [66]. From these 
samples, we collected 374 malware samples which are identified either to be packed by 
known tools like PECompact and UPX, or to contain overlay sections in their PE headers. 
(The samples with the overlay sections are likely to be packed executables.) According to 
the Norton Anti-Virus scan results, 7 of these samples are downloaders, and the rest are 
bot programs. 
Renovo UUnP Poly Unpack 
Extracted results 366 186 171 
IRC pattern found 363 176 86 
Avg. time (sec.) 40.9 15.7 365.8 
Table 3.2: Comparing Renovo with Other Unpackers on Real-world Malware Samples. 
As shown in Table 3.2, Renovo identified most of the samples to be packed executables; 
only 8 out of total 374 samples were identified as normal executables. However, these 8 
samples seem to have crashed or terminated before reaching the original hidden code. 
In comparison, both UUnP and PolyUnpack identified only about half of the samples to 
be packed executables. Like in the previous experiment, we also encountered exception 
handler problem when running UUnP on some of the samples. The average time for hidden 
code extraction is 40.9 seconds for Renovo, 15.7 seconds for UUnP, and 365.8 seconds for 
PolyUnpack. Considering that the system boot time of Renovo is about 30 seconds, the 
sheer code extraction time of Renovo is approximately 10 seconds which is less than that 
of UUnP. This is also a promising result when compared to the performance of Norton 
Anti-Virus. For the same set of mal ware samples, Norton Anti-Virus took 17 seconds per 
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sample in average. 
Unlike the evaluation using the synthetic samples where we have the original program 
binaries, it is difficult to verify the correctness of extracted code and data. Therefore, 
we examined extracted code and data to see if they contain any of the IRC commands 
that common bot programs use to communicate with control servers. Considering the fact 
that most of the samples (367 out of 374) are bot programs, the extracted code and data 
are likely to contain some of these IRC commands which are not present in the packed 
executables. As we see in the second row of Table 3.2, most of the extracted code and 
data extracted by Renovo contain these IRC command strings which have not been found 
in the packed malware samples. 
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Figure 3.3: Hidden Layers in Malware Samples 
Figure 3.3 shows the number of hidden layers found by Renovo and the number of 
corresponding samples. While most of the malware samples apply less than 20 hidden 
layers, some of the samples are found to use more than 500 hidden layers. Most of these 
highly-layered samples are applying unknown packing techniques which are not in the 
PEiD signature list. We conjecture that they might be a new type of packing technique 
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which generates and executes only some parts of the original code on the fly to protect 
itself from dynamic analysis techniques at run-time. We leave this for future research. 
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3.2 Analyze Privacy-breaching Behavior 
3.2.1 Background and Problem Scope 
Privacy-breaching malware, including spyware, keyloggers, network sniffers, stealth 
backdoors, and rootkits, collects users' private information, tampers with critical system 
states, and causes billions of dollars in damage. Surprisingly, even software provided 
by reputable vendors may contain code that performs undesirable actions which may 
violate users' privacy. For example, Google Desktop, a popular local file system search 
tool, actually sends sensitive user information such as the local search index files back 
to Google's servers in certain configuration settings [40]. In another widely publicized 
example, Sony Media Player installs a rootkit without the user's knowledge in order to 
enforce copyright restrictions and sends back users' music listening habits [81]. 
Malware detection and analysis is a challenging task, and current malware analysis 
and detection techniques often fall short and fail to detect many new, unknown malware 
samples. Current malware detection methods in general fall into two categories: signature-
based detection and heuristics-based detection. The former cannot detect new malware 
or new variants. The latter are often based on some heuristics such as the monitoring 
of modifications to the registry and the insertion of hooks into certain library or system 
interfaces. Since these heuristics are not based on the fundamental characteristics of 
malware, they can incur high false positive and false negative rates. 
We observe that numerous malware categories, including spyware, keyloggers, network 
sniffers, stealth backdoors, and rootkits, share similar fundamental characteristics, which 
lies in their malicious or suspicious information access and processing behavior. That is, 
36 
~ulated System 
~ 
Test Engine 
TEMU 
Taint Graphs 
Figure 3.4: Panorama System Overview 
they access, tamper, and (in some cases) leak sensitive information that was not intended 
for their consumption. For example, when a user inputs some text into an editor, benign 
software (except the editor) will not access this text, whereas a key logger will obtain the 
text, and then send it to the attacker. This behavior is typically exhibited without the 
user's knowledge or consent and it is this fundamental trait that separates such malicious 
applications from benign software. 
Problem Statement. Given an unknown binary program, we want to automatically 
determine if this program exhibits malicious or suspicious information access and process-
ing behavior and provide valuable insights about how the program accesses and processes 
the information in an abnormal way. 
3.2.2 Approach Overview 
At a higher level, our approach to automatically detect whether an unknown sample 
exhibits malicious behavior is a three-step process: test, monitor, and analyze. We focus 
on the analysis of Windows-based malware. Hence, we use an out-of-the-box installation 
of Microsoft Windows as the analysis environment. We regard all code that comes with 
this installation as being trusted (in contrast to the unknown sample about which we have 
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no information). We load the sample to be analyzed into this environment and mark 
which files belong to the loaded sample. We then run the entire environment including 
Microsoft Windows and the loaded sample in our system. Figure 3.4 depicts the overview 
of this approach. The system consists of the taint engine, the test engine, the malware 
detection engine, and the malware analysis engine. 
To perform our automatic mal ware detection and analysis, we run a series of automated 
tests, which is performed by the test engine. For each test, we generate events that 
introduce sensitive information into the guest system. This sensitive data is sent to some 
trusted application, and is not destined for the sample that is under analysis. We then 
monitor the behavior of the sample during the tests and record its information access and 
processing behavior with respect to the sensitive information introduced in the tests. To 
this end, we have designed the taint engine, which performs whole-system, fine-grained 
information flow tracking. It monitors how the sensitive information propagates within the 
whole guest system (including the propagation through the kernel and all applications). 
In particular, we need to investigate whether the information has propagated into the 
sample (i.e., whether it has been accessed by the sample) and what the sample has done 
with the information (e.g., sending it to an external server via the network). To monitor 
and record the information access and processing behavior of the sample, we make use of 
taint analysis technique in layered annotative execution. 
Note that even though dynamic taint analysis has been proposed before, our approach 
is the first generic framework that applies dynamic taint analysis to the problem domain 
of detecting and analyzing privacy-breaching malware. Furthermore, our system offers 
several new capabilities that are necessary in our problem setting: (1) Our system is OS-
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aware-in addition to hardware-level taint tracking, we need to understand the high-level 
representations of hardware states for the analysis; (2) We also need to identify what 
actions are performed by or on behalf of the sample under analysis, even if the sample 
performs code unpacking and dynamic code generation, and executes actions through 
libraries, etc.; (3) Our monitoring needs to be whole-system and fine-grained, in order to 
precisely detect all actions of the sample. 
The system-wide information behavior is captured by a graph representation, which we 
call taint graph. Taint graphs capture the taint propagation from the initial taint source 
(i.e., the sensitive information introduced in the tests) throughout the system. Using 
taint graphs, we can determine whether the unknown sample has performed malicious 
actions. In general, the decision whether an information access and processing behavior 
is considered malicious or benign is made with the help of policies. One characteristic 
property of many types of malicious code (such as keyloggers, spyware, stealth backdoors, 
and rootkits) is that they steal, leak or tamper with sensitive user information. Consider 
the following examples: (1) The user is typing input into an application such as a Microsoft 
Notepad, or is entering his user name and password into a web login form through a 
browser, while an unknown sample also accesses these keystrokes; (2) The user is visiting 
some websites, while an unknown sample accesses the webpages or URLs and sends them 
to a remote host; (3) The user is browsing a directory or searching a file, while an unknown 
sample intercepts the access to the directory entries and tampers with one or more entries. 
We devise a set of policies, which are used by the malware detection engine to detect 
malware from unknown samples. Finally, since taint graphs present invaluable insights 
about the samples' information access and processing behaviors, analysts can use the 
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malware analysis engine to examine the taint graphs, for detailed analysis information. 
3.2.3 System Design and Implementation 
We designed and implemented a system, called Panorama, to explore the feasibility 
of our approach. Panorama is built as a TEMU plugin, and is composed of the following 
components: test engine, taint engine, malware detection engine, and malware analysis 
engine. 
3.2.3.1 Test Engine 
The test engine allows us to perform the analysis of samples and the detection of 
malicious code without human intervention. It executes a number of test cases that 
mimic common tasks that a user might perform, such as editing text in an editor, visiting 
several websites, and so on. To automatically run tests, the test engine is equipped with 
scripts that execute all steps necessary for each test case. For our current implementation, 
these scripts are based on the open source program AutoHotkey [6]. Scripts can be either 
manually written or automatically generated by recording user actions while a task is 
performed. 
Whenever the test engine executes a certain test case, it introduces input (such as 
keystrokes or network packets) into the system. To determine which part of this input 
should be tainted (and with which taint label), the test engine cooperates with the taint 
engine. Currently, our system defines the following nine different types of taint sources: 
text, password, HTTP, HTTPS, ICMP, FTP, document, and directory, which will be 
discussed in Section 3.2.3.3. For example, when editing a document in an editor, the test 
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engine asks the taint engine to send keystrokes to the editor, and label them as text; when 
entering password in a secure web form, the test engine asks the taint engine to send 
keystrokes and label them as password. When considering these cases, it becomes evident 
that the taint engine requires support from the test engine to properly label input. In 
both cases, the keystroke information enters the system. However, in the former case, 
the keystroke is considered text as it is sent to the one of the text editors. In the latter, 
the recipient of the input is a password field and the keystroke information is marked as 
password. Clearly, this information is test-specific and not available at the hardware level. 
The data received as a response to the web requests are tainted as HTTP. The packets 
received in response to ping requests are labeled ICMP. The information sent by the FTP 
server are marked FTP. Finally, when listing a directory, all accessed disk blocks that 
hold file directory information are tainted as directory. The communication between the 
test engine and the taint engine is via an intercepted registry writing API: the test engine 
writes information into a pre-determined registry entry, and taint engine intercepts this 
API call and then obtains the information. 
3.2.3.2 Taint Engine 
The taint engine performs whole-system OS-aware taint tracking, by utilizing the func-
tionalities of semantics extractor and layered execution engine in TEMU. The system-wide 
propagation of tainted input introduced by the test engine forms a graph over the pro-
cesses/program modules and OS resources. For example, assume that a keystroke is 
tainted as text because it is part of the input sent to a text editor. When a user process A 
reads the character that corresponds to the keystroke, this fact is recorded by linking the 
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text taint source to process A. When this process later writes the character into a file F, 
from where it is then read by process B, we can establish a link from process A to the 
file, and subsequently from file F to process B. For clarity, we generate one graph for each 
taint source with a different label (that is, one graph that shows the flow of data labeled 
as text, one for password, ... ) . For each taint source, the taint propagation originating 
from this source forms a directed graph. We call this graph a taint graph. 
More formally, a taint graph can be represented as g = (V, E), where V is a set of 
vertices and E is a set of directed edges connecting the vertices, and we use g. root to 
represent the root node of graph g (i.e., the taint source). A vertex can either represent 
an operating system object (such as a process or module), an OS resource (such as a file), 
or a taint source (such as keyboard or network input with the appropriate labels). An 
edge between two vertices VI and v2 is introduced when tainted data is propagated from 
the entity that corresponds to VI to the entity that corresponds to v2. 
When generating the taint graphs, we map the hardware-level taint propagation infor-
mation to operating-system level. For example, the taint engine determines which process 
and which module (such as which dll) has performed a certain operation, and it also 
keeps track of whether this operation is performed on behalf of the sample under analysis. 
Also, writes to disk blocks are attributed to file objects and network operations to specific 
network connections. To further simplify the taint graphs, we apply the following opti-
mizations, without losing the dependencies between the sample under analysis and other 
objects: (1) we make the vertices for system kernel modules transparent; (2) for user-level 
instructions, if they are not derived from the sample under analysis (i.e., they are trusted), 
they are attributed to the processes they are running in, instead of the modules they are 
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from .I 
In a taint graph, each vertex is labeled with a (type, value) pair, where value is 
the unique name that identifies the vertex. For the root node, the type is one of the 
nine different input taint labels introduced previously. For any non-root node, the type 
represents the category of the node as a OS object, including process, module, keyboard, 
network, and file. Formally, the type of a vertex can be defined in a hierarchical form, as 
follows: 
type taint source I os_object 
taint_source : := text I password !HTTP I HTTPS! FTP I ICMP I 
document I directory 
os_object process I module I network I file 
(Wlnldgbh~d~!~~6ad.dll ·. ~ 
Figure 3.5: An Example of Taint Graph. 
Figure 3.5 shows an example of a taint graph. This graph reflects the procedure for 
Windows user authentication. While running in the background, a password thief catches 
the password and saves it to its log file "c:\ginalog.log". We use ellipses to represent 
process nodes and use shaded ellipses to represent the module node. We use an octagon 
1 In other words, the presence of a module node in a taint graph indicates at least one instruction of 
this module stems from the sample. 
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to represent the taint source (here, a password typed on the keyboard), and a rectangle 
to represent the other nodes. 
3.2.3.3 Malware Detection Engine 
Our essential observation is that numerous types of malicious code, including keylog-
gers, password thieves, network sniffers, stealth backdoors, spyware/adware, and rootkits, 
exhibit anomalous information access and processing behavior. Currently, we categorize 
three kinds of anomalous behavior: anomalous information access, anomalous information 
leakage, and excessive information access. 
Anomalous information access behavior. For some information sources, a simple 
access performed by the samples under analysis is already suspicious. We refer to this 
behavior as anomalous information access behavior. 
Considering the keyboard inputs, such information sources may include the text input 
sent to the text editor, the command sent to the command console, and the passwords sent 
to the Windows Logon dialog and secure web pages. Benign samples do not access these 
inputs, whereas keyloggers and password thieves will access these inputs. Keyloggers refer 
to the malicious programs that capture keystrokes destined for the other applications, 
and thus will access all these inputs. Password thieves, by definition, steal the password 
information, and therefore will access the password inputs. Note that password thieves 
can be a subset of keyloggers, because keyloggers may also record passwords. 
Similarly, some network inputs are not supposed to be accessed by unknown samples. 
For example, ICMP is designed for network testing and diagnosis purpose, and hence 
only operating system and trusted utilities (e.g. ping. exe) use it. For many TCP and 
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UDP applications, the incoming TCP and UDP traffic can only be accessed by their own 
and the operating system. Benign samples do not interfere with the process of these 
inputs. However, network sniffers and stealth backdoors access these inputs for different 
purposes. Network sniffers eavesdrop on the network traffic to obtain valuable information. 
Even though a network sniffer may not be directly interested in these inputs, it usually 
has to access them to check if they are valuable. Stealth backdoors refer to a class of 
malicious programs that contact with remote attackers without explicitly opening a port. 
To achieve stealthiness, the stealth backdoors either use an uncommon protocol such as 
ICMP, create a raw socket, or intercept the network stack, in order to communicate with 
remote adversaries. The ICMP-based stealth backdoors will access ICMP traffic. The raw-
socket-based stealth backdoor will access all the packets with the same protocol number. 
For example, a TCP raw socket will receive all TCP packets. The stealth backdoors 
intercepting the network stack will behave like a network sniffer. 
Anomalous information leakage behavior. For some other information sources, it is 
acceptable for the samples to access them locally, but unacceptable to leak the information 
to third parties. For example, spyware/adware programs record users' surfing habits and 
send this private information to third parties. In contrast, benign BHOs (i.e., Browser 
Helper Objects) may access this information but will not send it out. We consider the 
following as information leakage: the sample under analysis accesses the information and 
then saves it to disk or sends it over the network. Note that saving the information to 
disk covers three situations: saving it to files, the registry, and even individual disk blocks. 
We consider information sources like HTTP, HTTPS, documents, and URLs fall into this 
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category. 
Excessive information access behavior. For some information sources, benign sam-
ples may access some of them occasionally, while malicious samples will access them exces-
sively to achieve their malicious intent. We refer to it as anomalous information excessive 
access behavior. 
The directory information is such a case. Rootkits exhibit excessive access behavior to 
the directory information, because they attempt to conceal their presence in the filesystem 
by intercepting the accesses to directory information and removing the entries that point 
to their files. Thus, when recursively listing directories, we will see the rootkit samples 
accessing many disk blocks that contain directory information. A benign program may 
access some directory entries, or even scan directories occasionally. However, it is very 
unlikely that it accesses the same directories at the same time while we list directories. 
Test case description 
1. Edit a text file and save it 
2. Enter password in a GUI program 
3. Log in a secure website 
4. Visit several websites 
5. Log into an FTP server 
6. Recursively list a directory 
7. Send UDP packets into the system 
8. Ping a remote host 
Introduced inputs 
text, document 
password 
URL, password, HTTPS 
URL, HTTP 
text, password, FTP 
directory 
UDP 
ICMP 
Table 3.3: Test Cases and Introduced Inputs in Panorama 
Test cases and policies. According to the above discussion, we compile the following 
test cases and introduce the inputs with corresponding labels, as shown in Table 3.3. 
Specifically, we introduce text, password, URL inputs from the keyboard, HTTP, HTTPS, 
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FTP, ICMP, and UDP inputs from the network, and document and directory input from 
the disk. Note that in the test case 6, to eliminate the possibility that a benign program 
scans the same directory at a different time, we clean the taint labels of the visited directory 
entries after finishing with listing the directory. After finishing all the test cases, the test 
engine waits for a while (a configurable parameter) and then shuts down the guest machine. 
From the above discussion, we specify the following policies: (1) text, password, FTP, 
UDP and ICMP inputs cannot be accessed by the samples; (2) URL, HTTP, HTTPS and 
document inputs cannot be leaked by the samples; (3) directory inputs cannot be accessed 
excessively by the samples. More formally, we show how these policies are enforced on the 
taint graphs: 
Vg E G, (:lv E g.V,v.type =module) 1\ 
g.root.type E {text, password, FTP, UDP, ICMP} 
---; Violate( v, "No Access") 
:lg E G, (:lv E g.V,v.type =module) 1\ 
(g.root.type E {URL, HTTP, HTTPS, document}) 1\ 
(:Ju E descendants(v),u.type E {file, network}) 
---; Violate(v, "No Leakage!"); 
(Vg E G, g.root.type =directory-
:lv E g.V, v.type =module) 
---; Violate( v, "No Excessive Access") 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
In addition to manually specifying the policies, it is possible to automatically generate 
policies by using machine learning techniques. First, we can gather a representative collec-
tion of malware and benign samples as our training set. Using this training set, Panorama 
will extract the corresponding taint graphs. Then, we need to develop a mechanism to 
transform a taint graph into a feature vector. Based on the feature vectors for the benign 
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and malicious samples, standard classification algorithms can be applied to determine a 
model. Using this model, novel samples can then be classified. We will further explore 
this approach in our future work. 
3.2.3.4 Malware Analysis Engine 
Given a taint graph, the first step is to check this graph for the presence of a node 
that corresponds to the sample under analysis. If such a node is present, we obtain the 
information that the sample has accessed certain tainted input data. This is already 
suspicious, because the test cases are designed such that input data is sent to trusted 
applications, but never to the sample under analysis. Once we determine that a sample 
has accessed certain input, the sample's successor nodes in the graph can be examined. 
This indicates what has been done with the data that was captured. Such insights can 
be instrumental for system administrators and analysts to understand the behavior and 
actions of malware. 
As an example, recall the taint graph previously shown in Figure 3.5. This taint 
graph has been produced by automatically analyzing the behavior of the password thief 
program GINA spy [38]. Note that the entered password is received by the Windows 
Logon process (Winlogon. exe). This process passes the password on to lsass. exe for 
subsequent authentication. Interestingly, the password data is also accessed by the sample 
under analysis (mscad. dll), which is loaded by Winlogon. exe. This code module reads 
the password and saves it to a file called c: \ginalog .log. The graph correctly reflects 
how the user password is processed by Windows, and how the password thief intercepts 
it. 
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3.2.4 Evaluation 
Our evaluation consisted of three parts. First, we investigated the effectiveness of our 
taint-graph-based malware detection approach using a large body of real-world malware 
and benign samples. Then, by using Coogle Desktop as a case study (i.e., a sample from 
a vendor whose privacy policy we believed we could trust), we explored the amount of 
detailed information that we could extract from the taint graph of an unknown sample. 
Third, we performed tests to evaluate the performance overhead of our prototype. In all 
our experiments, we ran Panorama on a Linux machine with a dual-core 3.2 GHz Pentium 
4 CPU and 2GB RAM. On top of Panorama, we installed Windows XP Professional with 
512M of allocated RAM. 
3.2.4.1 Malware Detection 
I Category Total False Negatives False Positives I 
Key loggers 5 0 -
Password thieves 2 0 -
Network sniffers 2 0 -
Stealth backdoors 3 0 -
Spywarejadware 22 0 -
Rootkits 8 0 -
Browser plugins 16 - 1 
Multi-media 9 - 0 
Security 10 - 2 
System utilities 9 - 0 
Office productivity 4 - 0 
Games 4 - 0 
Others 4 - 0 
I Sum 98 0 3 
Table 3.4: Detection Results on Malware and Benign Samples using Panorama 
Our malware collection consisted of 42 real-world malware samples, including 5 keylog-
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gers, 2 password thieves, 2 network sniffer, 3 stealth backdoors, and 22 spyware BHOs, and 
8 rootkits. Some of these samples were publicly available on the Internet (e.g., from web 
sites such as www. rootkit. com), while others were collected from academic researchers and 
an Austrian anti-virus company. Furthermore, we downloaded 56 benign, freely-available 
samples from a reputable and trustworthy web site (www.download.com). These benign 
samples were freeware programs from a wide range of different application domains (such 
as browser plug-ins, system utilities, and office productivity applications), with the size 
up to 3MB. 
To further facilitate the experiments, we developed a tool using Python to run the 
samples and automatically perform the installation procedure (if required) using several 
heuristics. The tool can handle 70% of the samples in our test set. For the remaining sam-
ples, some required manual configuration (they were all malware samples), and the others 
were not properly handled by the heuristics. We then manually installed the remaining 
samples. We installed up to 3 samples each time. After that, we ran the test cases. We set 
the test engine to wait for 5 minutes before shutting down the guest machine. Depending 
on the installation delay, the whole procedure lasts 15 to 25 minutes. 
Table 3.4 summarizes the results of this experiment. We can see that Panorama was 
able to correctly identify all malware samples, but falsely declared three benign samples 
to be malicious. 
Two of these false positives were personal firewall programs. The third false positive 
was a browser accelerator. By checking the taint graphs related to these three samples, 
we observed that the information access and processing behaviors of these benign samples 
closely resemble that of malware. In fact, the two personal firewalls install packet filters 
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and monitor all network traffic. Hence, their behavior resembles that of a malicious 
network sniffer. In the case of the browser accelerator, we observed that the application 
prefetches web pages on behalf of the browser and stores them into its own cache files. 
This behavior resembles that of spyware that monitors the web pages that a user is surfing. 
The reason for our false positives is that our taint-graph-based detection approach can 
only identify the information access and processing behavior of a given sample, but not its 
intent. In real-life, the taint graphs are invaluable for human analysts, as they help them 
to quickly determine and understand whether an unknown sample is indeed malicious, or 
whether it is benign software that is exhibiting malware-like behavior. 
3.2.4.2 Malware Analysis 
In order to determine how well we are able to perform detailed analysis on an unknown 
sample, we chose Google Desktop for a case study. This application claims in its privacy 
policy [41] that it will index and store data files, mail, chat logs, and the web history of 
a user while the user is working on her system. Furthermore, if the special configuration 
setting "Search Across Computers" is enabled, Google Desktop will securely transmit 
copies of the user's index files to Google servers. Hence, Google Desktop, in fact, exhibits 
some malware-like behavior, as the index files may contain sensitive information about 
a user (e.g., a list of web sites that the user has visited), and these files are sent to an 
external server. 
First, we downloaded the installation file ( GoogleDesktopSetup. exe). Before installing 
the tool, we marked the installation file such that we could track which components would 
be installed into the system. After the installation was complete, we observed that 18 
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executables and shared libraries, as well as a dozen data files were installed. 
Second, we ran the test cases, using the default settings of Google Desktop (in which 
"Search Across Computers" is disabled). After performing the test cases, we observed 
that some components extracted from the installation file accessed the tainted inputs, 
including HTTPS, HTTP and document. All of this information was later saved into the 
index files in the local installation directory. To determine if the information is sent out 
to remote hosts, we kept the system alive for 12 hours. However, we did not observe this 
behavior. 
Third, we changed the settings of Google Desktop and enabled the feature "Search 
Across Computers". Then, we ran the test cases again and kept the system alive for 
another 30 minutes. It was evident from the generated taint graphs that, in this mode, 
Google Desktop did leak the collected information via HTTPS connections to Google 
servers. We picked a representative taint graph, which clearly illustrates how the com-
ponents of Google Desktop process the incoming traffic of an HTTP connection from the 
QEMU web site we visited, (see Figure 3.6). 
By examining this taint graph, we can draw several conclusions: (I) the incoming web 
page was first received and processed by the Internet Explorer (I EXPLORE. EXE), which 
later saved the content into a cache file ( qemu [1] . htm) under the temporary Internet file 
folder; (2) a component from Google Desktop (GoogleDesktopAPI2.dll) was loaded into 
the IEXPLORE. EXE, obtained the web page, and passed it over to a stand-alone program also 
from Google Desktop ( GoogleDesktopindex. exe); (3) GoogleDesktopindex. exe further 
processed this information and saved it into two data files (rpmlm. cfl and fiih.htl) in 
its local installation directory; and ( 4) it sent some information derived from the web page 
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to a remote Coogle server (72.14.219.147) through an HTTPS connection. 
With the capability provided by Panorama, we could confirm that Coogle Desktop 
really sends some sensitive information if a special feature is activated (as it also claims 
in its privacy policy). 
3.2.4.3 Performance Overhead 
We measured Panorama's performance overhead using several utilities in Cygwin, such 
as curl, scp, gzip, and bzip2. When running these tools, we tainted file and network inputs 
accordingly. We found that the current un-optimized implementation of Panorama suffers 
a slowdown of 20 times on average. 
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3.3 Analyze Hooking Behavior 
3.3.1 Background of Hooking Attacks 
One important malware attacking vector that need to be thoroughly understood is 
its hooking mechanism. Malicious programs implant hooks for many different purposes. 
Spyware may implant hooks to get notified of the arrival of new sensitive data. For 
example, keyloggers may install hooks to intercept users' keystrokes; password thieves 
may install hooks to get notified of the input of users' passwords; network sniffers may 
install hooks to eavesdrop on incoming network traffic; and BHO-based adware may also 
install hooks to capture URLs and other sensitive information from incoming web pages. 
In addition, rootkits may implant hooks to intercept and tamper with critical system 
information to conceal their presence in the system. Malware with a stealth backdoor 
may also place hooks on the network stack to establish a stealthy communication channel 
with remote attackers. 
Several tools [13,47, 74] detect hooking behaviors by checking known memory regions 
for suspicious entries. However, they need prior knowledge of how existing malware im-
plants hooks. Therefore, they become futile when malware uses new hooking mechanisms. 
This concern is not hypothetical. Recently, new stealthy kernel backdoors [75, 88] are 
reported to employ a novel hooking mechanism for intercepting the network stack. All 
existing detection methods have failed to detect this type of malware. 
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3.3.2 Problem Statement 
Given a malware sample, we aim to determine whether it contains hooking behaviors. 
A hooking behavior can be formalized as follows. A malicious program C attempts to 
change a memory location L of the operating system, to implant a hook H. When a 
certain event happens, the operating system will load the hook H, and then starts to 
execute malicious code F in program C. We refer to the address ofF as hook entry, and 
L as hook site. 
#define SYSTEMSERVICE(_function) \ 
KeServiceDescriptorTable.ServiceTableBase \ 
[*(PULONG)((PUCHAR)_function+l)] 
void HookSyscalls() { 
} 
OldZwOpenKey = SYSTEMSERVICE(ZwOpenKey); 
SYSTEMSERVICE(ZwOpenKey) = NewZwOpenKey; 
The above code snippet shows a piece of pseudo code that hooks an entry in the System 
Service Descriptor Table (SSDT) of Windows system. This hooking mechanism is used 
in many kernel-mode malware samples, such as the Sony Rootkit [81]. In this example, 
the hook entry F is NewZwOpenKey, and the hook site Lis the entry for ZwOpenKey in the 
service descriptor table, and the hook His the address of NewZwOpenKey, as illustrated in 
Figure 3.7. 
C: Malicious Program F: NewZwOpenKey 
------
I 
I 
I 
I 
L: Ho~ : ~Hook 
..__1 ~····.····_· ·--..~..· ·1_ .. /f.J...:.--. . ·'----·········--..:..11 SSDT 
ZwOpenKey 
Figure 3. 7: An SSDT Hooking Example 
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If we detect hooking behaviors in a malware sample, we want to provide some valuable 
insights about hooking mechanism, in form of a graphical representation, hook graph. 
A hook graph tells us two main characteristics of a hooking mechanism: hook type and 
implanting mechanism. 
Hook Type Depending how it is interpreted by the CPU, a hook H can be either a 
data hook or a code hook. A data hook is interpreted as data by the CPU, and is used as 
the destination address of some control transfer instruction to jump into the hook entry 
F. For example, the hook in Figure 3.7 is a data hook, because it is the address of the 
hook entry, and is interpreted as the jump target. A code hook is interpreted as code 
by the CPU. A code hook contains a jump-like instruction (such as jmp and call), and 
is injected to overwrite some system code (such as kernel modules and common DLLs). 
When a code hook is activated, the execution is redirected into the malicious code F. We 
need to detect hooking behaviors in both cases, and we should be able to tell what kind 
of hook it is when we detect one. As we will see later, the policies used to detect hooking 
behaviors are different between these two categories due to their different nature. 
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Implanting Mechanism Malware has two choices to install H into L. First, it may 
directly write H into L using its own code. Second, it may call a function to achieve it on 
its behalf. Windows system provides several APis for applications to register various event 
handlers (i.e., hooks). For example, SetWindowsHookEx allows an application to register 
a hook for certain Windows event, such as keystroke events. Whenever a keystroke is 
entered into the system, Windows will call the hook function provided by this application. 
In addition, functions like memcpy and Wri teProcessMemory can overwrite a memory 
region on behalf of their callers. Thus, once we identify a hook, we need to determine 
which method the malware used to register the hook. 
If the malware directly modifies L to install H, we need to understand where L is, 
and how the malware sample obtains L. Since L is usually not located in a fixed place, 
malware has to find it from some static point. This static point can be a global system 
symbol, or the result of a function call. After obtaining this static point, malware may 
walk through the data structures referenced by it to eventually locate L. The example 
in Figure 3.7 makes use of this method, and the hook site L is calculated from a global 
symbol KeServiceDescriptorTable. For this type of implanting mechanism, the hook 
graph answers the following questions: 
• Where is the static point? 
• How does the malware obtain the static point? 
• How does it infer the final location L from the static point? 
If the mal ware invokes an external function to register H, we need to identify the 
function's address and name. In addition, we need to know the actual arguments that 
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are used to call this function. The function call and its argument list can give semantic 
information about how the hook and what kind of hook is registered. For example, if we 
identify that a malicious program calls SetWindowsHookEx to register a hook, we are able 
to tell from the first argument what type of hook is registered. For this type of implanting 
mechanism, the hook graph answers the following questions: 
• What is the external function, including its entry address and its name? 
• What arguments does the mal ware use to invoke this function? 
3.3.3 Our Technique 
We make the following key observation. Malicious code makes changes, including 
memory and the other machine state changes, to the execution environment as it runs. 
We call these changes impacts. Obviously, a hook H is one of the impacts made by 
the malicious code, and this impact finally redirects the execution control flow into the 
malicious code. Hence, if we are able to identify all the impacts of the malicious code, 
and observe one of the impacts being used to cause the execution to be redirected into the 
malicious code, we can determine a hook installed by the malicious code. Furthermore, 
we are also interested in how an impact is formulated, for the purpose of understanding 
hooking mechanism. Therefore, we identify initial impacts, the newly introduced impacts 
by the malicious code, and then keep track of the impacts propagating over the system. 
Based on this key observation, we propose fine-grained impact analysis for hook detec-
tion, and semantics-aware impact dependency analysis for hook analysis. 
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Hook Detection: Fine-grained Impact Analysis We mark all the initial impacts 
made by the malicious code at byte level. The initial impacts include data written directly 
by the malicious code, and data written by the external code (through function calls) on 
its behalf. Then we keep track of the impacts propagating through the whole system. 
During the execution, if we observe that the instruction pointer (i.e., EIP in x86 CPUs) 
is loaded with a marked impact, and the execution jumps immediately into the malicious 
code, then we identify a hook. Furthermore, in this case, we have determined that the 
jump target is the hook entry F, the memory location that the instruction pointer is 
loaded from is the hook site L, and the content within L is the hook H. 
Hooking Mechanism Analysis: Semantics-aware Impact Dependency Analysis 
Once identifying a hook H, we want to understand the hooking mechanism. During 
the impact propagation, we record into a trace the details about how the impacts are 
propagated in the system. Therefore, from the trace entry corresponding to the detected 
hook H, we can perform backward dependency analysis on the trace. The result gives 
how the hook His formulated and installed into the hook site L. However, such a result is 
difficult to understand, because it only provides hardware-level information and sometimes 
can be enormous. We combine OS-level semantics information with the result, and perform 
several optimizations to hide unnecessary details. The final output is a succinct and 
intuitive graphical representation, assisting malware analysts to understand its hooking 
mechanism. 
Note that our approach would catch "normal" hooking behaviors. Windows provides 
a number of APis, such as CreateThread and CreateWindow, for applications to register 
Windows 
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Hook Graph 
their callback functions. Windows will invoke these callbacks on certain events. These 
function calls that register normal hooks can be compiled into a white-list. Then if one 
of these normal hooks is captured by our detection step, we can classify it as normal, by 
extracting its hooking mechanism and comparing it with the white-list. In practice, we find 
this white-listing approach very effective. Note that "normal" hooks are not considered 
false positives in our case, since our goal is to extract and analyze any hooking mechanism 
which may be employed by the sample of interest. 
3.3.4 System Design and Implementation 
To demonstrate the feasibility of our approach, we design and implement a system, 
H ookFinder, to identify the hooking behavior and understand the hooking mechanism. 
As illustrated in Figure 3.8. HookFinder is built as a plugin of our dynamic binary 
analysis platform, TEMU. The malware to be analyzed is executed in the emulated Win-
dows guest system. HookFinder consists of two components: hook detector and hook 
analyzer. The hook detector performs fine-grained impact analysis and detects hooks. To 
analyze hooking mechanisms, the impact propagation events, as well as necessary OS-level 
semantics information, are recorded into a trace, .called the impact trace. Note that TEMU 
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provides OS-level semantics information of the emulated execution environment. The hook 
analyzer analyzes the impact trace and generates a succinct and intuitive graphical repre-
sentation, hook graph. The hook graph conveys essential information for malware analysts 
to easily understand the hooking mechanism. 
3.3.4.1 Hook Detector 
The hook detector performs fine-grained impact analysis. More specifically, the hook 
detector marks initial impacts made by the malicious code, keeps track of impact propa-
gation, and detect diverted control flow caused by impacts. 
Mark initial impacts. We need to identify all the initial impacts that can be used to 
install hooks. This is important, because if we fail to mark some initial impacts, malware 
writers may exploit this fact to evade our detection. 
First, we consider that an instruction from malicious code directly makes an impact. 
When an executable binary is loaded into the system, a module space is allocated for it, 
and the code and data segments from the binary are copied into this module space and 
initialized. Note that the semantics extractor in TEMU is able to tell which module space 
belongs to the sample under analysis. Then, for an instruction located in that module, we 
need to mark its impact accordingly. That is, we mark the destination operand, either a 
memory location or a CPU register, if it is not marked already. 
In addition, we consider that malicious code may make an impact by calling an external 
function. For example, it may call ReadFile to obtain the address of the hook entry F 
from a configuration file, and then install it as the hook H into the hook site L by calling 
memcpy. If we do not consider this situation, H will not be marked. Therefore, we need to 
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mark the output of that external function too. Again, the semantics extractor in TEMU 
is able to tell if an instruction is executed under the context of an external function call. 
To identify the impacts made in an external function, we treat memory writes and 
register writes differently. For memory writes, we mark a memory location if it is written 
under the context of the external function call, and it is not a local variable on the stack. 
To determine a local variable, we obtain the stack range for the current thread from the 
semantics extractor, and compare the memory location with the value of ESP on the entry 
of the external function call: if the memory location is smaller than the value of ESP and 
within the stack range, then it is a local variable. For register writes, we only need to 
consider EAX. According to the function calling conventions (i.e., _cdecl and _stdcall) in 
Windows, EAX contains the return value when applicable, while the other general-purpose 
registers (except the stack pointer ESP) remain unchanged. Now we need to determine if 
EAX contains the return value and mark it accordingly. We save the value of EAX on the 
entry of an external function call, and then on the exit of the function, check if EAX is 
changed. If so, we mark this EAX. 
Furthermore, malware may dynamically generate new code. Since self-generated code 
is also part of impacts made by the malicious code, the memory region occupied by it 
must have already been marked. Thus, we can determine if an instruction is generated 
from the original malicious binary by simply checking if the memory region occupied by 
that instruction is marked. If so, we also treat that code region as malicious code, and 
mark the inputs taken by the self-generated code too. 
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Track impact propagation. The hook detector keeps track of the impacts propagat-
ing throughout the system. It tracks data dependencies between source and destination 
operands. That is, if any byte of any source operand is marked, the destination operand 
is also marked. In addition, for a memory source operand, if its address becomes marked, 
it also marks the destination operand. This policy enables us to track how the malicious 
code walks through a data structure, starting from a marked pointer to the data structure. 
The hook detector utilizes the taint analysis technique in layered annotative execution pro-
vided by TEMU to track impact propagation. Note that the hook detector keeps track of 
impacts propagating over the whole system, including the disk. It still keeps track of the 
impacts that are swapped out to disk, or written to the registry and filesystem. Therefore, 
it is able to detect the hooks that are registered through the registry and filesystem. 
Here, impact analysis is slightly different from traditional taint analysis, in the way how 
it deals with immediate operands. That is, if an instruction has an immediate operand, 
impact analysis checks if the memory region occupied by this immediate is marked and 
if so, propagates the impact accordingly. In contrast, traditional taint analysis systems 
treat immediate operands as clean. In our scenario, the malicious code may overwrite the 
system code with manipulated immediate numbers in the instructions. For example, in 
the code hook case, the malicious code may inject into the system code a jump instruction 
with a hard-coded target address,' to redirect the execution to the malicious code. This 
immediate operand is a crucial impact that is deliberately injected by the malicious code 
to set up a hook. Therefore, we need to check immediate operands. 
To enable subsequent hook analysis, the hook detector performs an extra operation 
during the impact propagation. That is, we assign a unique identifier to each marked 
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byte of the destination operand. We refer to this identifier as dependency ID. Then for 
each instruction that creates or propagates the marked data, we write a record into the 
impact trace. The record contains the relationships between the dependency IDs of marked 
source and the destination operand, associated with other detailed information about that 
instruction. 
Detect hooks. The hook detector detects a hook by checking if the control flow is 
affected by some marked value, which redirects the execution into the malicious code. More 
precisely, we observe whether the instruction pointer EIP is marked, and the execution 
jumps immediately from the system code into the malicious code region, or the code region 
generated from the malicious code. If the conditions are satisfied, we identify a hook: the 
jump target is the hook entry F, the memory location that EIP is loaded from is L, and 
the content in L is H. 
The above policy functions properly for identifying data hooks, but is problematic for 
code hooks. This is because a code hook is a piece of code generated by the malicious 
code, and thus is treated as malicious code by the above policy. Therefore when the code 
hook redirects the execution to the malicious code, the above policy will not raise an alarm 
because it sees the execution being transferred from malicious code to malicious code. To 
solve this problem, we extend the above policy such that the execution transitions from a 
code hook region into malicious code will raise an alert. 
Then the question is how to distinguish code hook regions with other self-generated 
code regions. Self-generated code usually remains in the module space of the malicious 
code, or stays in a region that is not occupied by any module (such as in heap), whereas 
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a code hook region is a piece of code that overwrites a code region in a different module. 
Therefore, during execution, if the currently executed basic block is marked and from a 
different module, and EIP is marked and jumps into the malicious code, we identify it as 
a code hook. 
3.3.4.2 Hook Analyzer 
Once a suspicious hook is identified, the hook analyzer is able to extract essential in-
formation about its hooking mechanism by performing semantics-aware dependency anal-
ysis on the impact trace. The procedure consists of the following three steps: (1) from 
the hook H, perform backward dependency analysis on the impact trace, and generate 
hardware-level hook graph; (2) with the OS-level semantics information, transform the 
hardware-level hook graph into an OS-level hook graph; and (3) if necessary, simplify the 
hook graph by hiding unnecessary details and merging similar nodes. We detail these 
steps respectively. 
(a) Hardware-level hook graph 
arics.sys+f61: mov] arics.sys+66e, (%ecx,'Jr,eax,4) 
Mf ntoskrnl .cxe+c2efc ]=0xl"8ah 166c 
(b) OS-level hook graph 
Figure 3.9: Hardware-level and OS-level Hook Graphs for Sony Rootkit. 
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Hardware-level Hook Graph. A hook graph represents dependencies among mal-
ware's instructions that are used to implant a hook. A node of a hook graph corresponds 
to an instruction involving hooking behavior; an edge of a hook graph points from an 
instruction setting an operand to an instruction using the operand as source. 
Recall that each record in the impact trace has dependency information. With the 
hook H identified by our hook detector, we create the first node in our hook graph, 
representing the instruction that activates H. We then obtain the hook's dependency 
ID I Dh, and locate the record that defines I Dh in the impact trace. Finally, we search 
backwards in the impact trace to add dependency information. Specifically, for each record 
R in the impact trace, if it creates a new dependency ID id that is used in the hook graph, 
we added a node N representing the instruction corresponding R, and add edges from 
N to other nodes that uses id as source operands in their corresponding instructions. 
We perform this backward search recursively until we reach the beginning of the trace. 
Besides the dependency information, each record contains detailed information about an 
instruction, such as its address and the values of its operands. If the instruction is executed 
under the context of an external function, the record also contains the entry address of 
that external function, and the value of ESP on the entry of call. We also put these details 
into the corresponding nodes. The resultant graph is the hardware-level hook graph. 
Figure 3.9(a) shows a hardware-level hook graph built from a hook in Sony Rootkit [81], 
which employs the same hooking mechanism as the sample shown in Figure 3.7. A rectan-
gle node denotes an instruction propagating malware's impacts. A diamond node denotes 
that its successor's destination address is affected by the malware's impacts. Note that 
to save space, we only display really important information for each node, such as the 
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instruction address and the disassembled instruction. For each memory operand, we show 
its address and value. If the instruction is executed under the context of an external 
function call, we also show the entry of the function call and the ESP value on the entry. 
OS-level Hook Graph. With the OS-level semantics information provided by the se-
mantics extractor, we can transform a hardware-level hook graph into an OS-level hook 
graph. Given the address of an instruction, we can show which module it belongs to and 
its offset to the module base. Similarly for memory access, we can determine if it falls 
into any module space. If the memory access is to a symbol, we can even resolve its 
symbol name. Given the entry address of an external function, we can resolve its function 
name. Then, the resulting graph is an OS-level hook graph. Figure 3.9(b) illustrates 
the OS-level hook graph transformed from Figure 3.9(a). We can see that Figure 3.9(b) 
correctly reflects the hook registration procedure shown in Figure 3.7. That is, symbols 
ZwOpenKey and KeServiceDescriptorTable are used to calculate the hook site L (shown 
in the diamond-shaped node), and an address (aries.sys+66e) is written into L. This is 
the hook H, the address of the hook entry F. 
In addition to resolving function names, HookFinder also extracts function arguments 
from an impact trace. Since pushing arguments onto the stack is also part of the impacts 
made by a malware sample, the information about these arguments is already recorded in 
the impact trace. To extract a function's arguments, HookFinder locates the first record 
R of the activation of the function. The records preceding R contain function arguments, 
but may also contain other non-argument impacts made by the malware. As the impacts 
trace has information about the value of register ESP at the beginning of the function's 
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Sample Size I Packed? I Kernel/User I Category 
Troj/Keylogg-LF 64KB y User Key logger 
Troj/Thief 334KB N User Password Thief 
AFXRootkit [1] 24KB y User Rootkit 
CFSD [16] 28KB N Kernel Rootkit 
Sony Rootkit [81] 5.6KB N Kernel Rootkit 
Vanquish [94] 110KB N User Rootkit 
Hacker Defender [46] 96KB N Both Rootkit 
U ay Backdoor [88] 212KB N Kernel Backdoor 
Table 3.5: Malware Samples Analyzed in HookFinder 
activation, we only include the impacts within a certain distance to the value of ESP. In 
the current implementation, we search for up to 10 four-byte words following the location 
of ESP as arguments. 
Graph Simplification. A hook graph can be very complex in some cases. For better 
readability and clarity, we simplify it using the following criteria: (1) if two adjacent nodes 
belong to the same external function call, we merge them into a single virtual node; (2) 
if two adjacent nodes are direct-copy instructions, such as mov, push, and pop, we merge 
them into a single node, because these instructions propagate the same value without 
modification. We apply these two criteria repeatedly on our hook graph until no nodes 
can be merged. The result is often a graph much clearer to be interpreted. 
3.3.5 Evaluation 
We evaluated HookFinder with eight malware samples. In Table 3.5, we characterize 
these samples according to whether they are packed, whether they are kernel or user 
threats, and which categories they belong to. 
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Sample Runtime Trace Hooks Hooking Mechanism 
Total I Mal 
Troj/Keylogg-LF 6m+9m 3.7G 2 1 Data, Cali:SetWindowsHookEx (WH_KEYBDARD_LL, ... ) 
Troj/Thief 4m+3s 143M 1 1 Data, Cali:SetWindowsHookEx(WH_CALLWINDPRDC, ... ) 
AFXRootkit 6m+33m 14G 4 3 Code, Call:Wri teProcessMemory 
CFSD 4m+2m 2.8G 5 4 Data, Call:FltRegisterFilter 
Sony Rootkit 4m+2s 25M 4 4 Data, Direct, Static Point:KeServiceDescriptorTable 
Vanquish 6m+l2m 4.4G 11 11 Code, Direct, Static Point:GetProcAddress 
Hacker Defender 5m+27m 7.4G 4 1 Code, Call:NtWri teVirtualMemory 
U ay backdoor 4m+25s 117M 5 2 Data, Direct, Static Point:NdisRegisterProtocol 
Table 3.6: Summarized Experimental Results using HookFinder 
Summarized Result In the experiment, HookFinder has successfully identified hooks 
for all the samples. We summarize the results in Table 3.6. In the second column of 
Table 3.6, we list the elapsed time for each sample. It breaks down into two parts: the 
runtime for running the sample in the emulated environment (shown as the first number), 
and the runtime for generating hook graphs (as the second number). After executing 
a sample, we wait for 2-3 minutes to make sure it has fully started. In order to trigger 
potential hook behavior, we then perform a series of simple interactions with the emulated 
system, including listing a directory, and pinging a remote host, which may cost another 2 
or 3 minutes. The runtime for generating hook graphs varies from 2 seconds to 33 minutes, 
depending on the trace size, the number of hooks, and other factors. In total, HookFinder 
spends up to 39 minutes on a sample during the evaluation, which is efficient compared 
to manual malware analysis that can last hours or days. 
The third column lists the size of the impact trace for each sample. As we can see, the 
maximum size in the table is 14G, which is acceptable for a complex program executing 
millions of instructions. 
The fourth and fifth column shows the number of suspicious hooks and the total number 
of identified hooks, for each sample. We found some normal hooks registered by the fol-
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lowing functions: EVENT_SINK_AddRej, FltDoCompleteProcessing WhenSaje, StarlSer-
viceDispatcherA, CreateThread, CreateRemoteThread, and PsCreateSystemThread. Note 
that our approach does not distinguish the intent of a hooking behavior. Thus, we will 
identify all hooks in the first place; then we check normal hooks by comparing them with 
our white-list. 
The last column gives essential information about the hooking mechanism. We found 
that three samples installed code hooks. All three samples derive the hook sites by call-
ing GetProcAddress. Vanquish directly writes the hooks into the hook sites, whereas 
AFXRootkit and Hacker Defender call WriteProcessMemory and Nt Write VirlualMem-
ory respectively to achieve it. The other six samples installed data hooks, four of which 
call external functions to install the hooks. In particular, CFSD calls FltRegisterFil-
ter, and Trojan/Keylogg-LF and Troj/Thief call Set WindowsHookEx. We also extracted 
arguments for these function calls, and we found that Trojan/Keylogg-LF installed a 
WH_KEYBOARD_LL hook, and Trojan/Thief installed a WH_CALLWINDPROC hook. 
The remaining two samples directly write hooks into hook sites. The static points are 
KeServiceDescriptorTable and NdisRegisterProtocol for Sony Rootkit and Uay Backdoor, 
respectively. 
Detailed Result for Uay backdoor HookFinder identified five data hooks in total for 
this sample. We reviewed the generated hook graphs, and we found that three of them 
were installed by PsCreateSystemThread. This kernel function creates a system thread 
with the thread entry provided by the caller. Thus, these three hooks are normal hooks. 
The other two are suspicious, and their hook graphs are similar. We show one graph in 
Figure 3.10. 
NDIS.sys+829a: mov %ecx,Ox!O(%ebx) 
Call: NdisRegisterProtocol 
[OxSI dd0f38]=0x81 e95ca8 
NDIS.sys+828c: mov %ebx, (%eax) 
Call: NdisReglsterProtocol 
l Oxf5 6f2d68l=Ox 81 dd0f28 
Figure 3.10: Hook Graph for Uay 
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As we can see in Figure 3.10, there are two branches in the bottom. The left branch 
describes how the hook site L was inferred, and the right branch presents how the hook 
H was formulated. From the top of the right branch, we can see that H originated from 
the output of a function call NdisAllocateMemory With Tag. This kernel function is used 
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to allocate a memory region in the kernel space. According to the function's semantics, 
this output has to be the address of the allocated memory region. This address is finally 
implanted into the hook site L. 
From the top of the left branch, we observe that L is derived from the output of 
a function call NdisRegisterProtocol. This kernel function registers a network protocol. 
According to the function semantics, we believe this output is the protocol handle in the 
second argument. This handler points to an internal data structure maintained by the 
Windows kernel. Then we can see the instruction (at uay.sys+ 1695) reads a field with the 
offset OxlO in this data structure. The obtained value ( v1 ) is then used as a pointer to 
read another value ( v2) from the offset OxlO in the data structure pointed by v1, in the 
subsequent instruction (at uay.sys+16a0). Then, the instruction (at uay.sys+1589) adds 
v2 with Ox40, and the resulted value is eventually used as the hook site L. We believe 
that this sample actually walks into this internal data structure that it obtains from 
NdisRegisterProtocol, and locates the designated hook site L. Interestingly, the definition 
of the data structure for the protocol handle created from NdisRegisterProtocol is not 
released in any documentation from Microsoft, but this malware sample seems to be able 
to understand this data structure, and knows how to locate the desired hook site from it. 
The hook graph for another suspicious hook is very similar to this one, except that it 
adds v2 with OxlO. With the knowledge of how this internal structure is defined, we would 
be able to tell which two functions this malware sample actually hooked. 
By analyzing this sample using HookFinder, we are able to unveil a novel mechanism for 
intercepting the network stack employed by malware. That is, malware can tamper with 
the function pointers in some kernel data structures associated with registered network 
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protocols. With this important understanding, we can verify and protect the integrity of 
these data structures, to defend against this kind of hooking mechanism. 
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3.4 Analyze Trigger Conditions and Hidden Behaviors 
3.4.1 Background, Problem Scope and Approach Overview 
In many malware programs, certain code paths implementing malicious behaviors will 
only be executed when certain trigger conditions are met [43, 56, 84, 85]. We call such 
behavior trigger-based behavior. Trigger-based behavior may be set off by many differ-
ent trigger types, such as time, system events, and network inputs. For example, many 
viruses attack their host systems on specific dates, such as Friday the 13th or April Fool's 
Day [56, 85]; worms may launch attacks at specific times [37], some key loggers only record 
keystrokes to files when the application window name contains certain keywords [43]; some 
browser-helper-object-based spyware only logs information if the URL contains a certain 
keyword [84]; some distributed denial-of-service tools only start launching attacks when 
receiving certain network commands [25]. Thus, trigger-based behavior is a real problem, 
causing millions of dollars of damage [43, 56, 84, 85, 89-91], and detecting trigger-based be-
havior is important for understanding the malware's malicious behavior and for effective 
malware defense. 
Currently, trigger-based behavior is often analyzed in a tedious, manual process. In 
this work, we aim to design an approach for automatic trigger-based behavior analysis. 
We first observe that at a high level, triggers in a program are implemented as conditional 
jumps depending on inputs from the trigger types of interest such as time, keyboard, or 
network inputs. The malicious code is triggered when the conditional jumps evaluate to 
the desired directions, e.g., the current time is equal to the trigger time. Therefore, given 
trigger types of interest, one key to uncovering trigger-based behavior is to construct values 
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for symbolic inputs (i.e., inputs from trigger types of interest) that makes the conditional 
jumps evaluate in the desired direction, activating the trigger-dependent code. We call 
the condition that the symbolic inputs need to satisfy in order for the code execution to go 
down a path uncovering the trigger-based behavior the trigger condition, and the values of 
the symbolic inputs satisfying the trigger condition the trigger values. Second, we observe 
that trigger-based behavior could be embedded at any point in the program. Thus, we 
need to be able to explore many different program paths which could depend on symbolic 
inputs. 
From these observations, we design an approach as a first step towards automatic 
trigger-based behavior analysis in malware. Our approach takes as inputs the binary pro-
gram of the malware to be analyzed and a set of trigger types. In order to automatically 
explore trigger-based behavior in the program based on the given trigger types, we em-
ploy symbolic execution to automatically and iteratively explore different code paths which 
could depend on symbolic inputs. In particular, symbolic inputs are represented symboli-
cally, and instructions that depend upon the symbolic inputs operate on symbolic values, 
and are executed symbolically. Conversely, instructions that do not depend on symbolic 
inputs operate on concrete values, and are concretely (natively) evaluated (for efficiency). 
Thus, symbolic execution builds up symbolic formulas over the symbolic inputs (which 
are in turn based on the trigger types). 
3.4.2 System Design and Implementation 
We design and implement a prototype, called MineSweeper, to analyze hidden behav-
ior and trigger conditions. We make symbolic execution functionality in TEMU as an 
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important building block. 
Trigger Type Specification The user begins analysis by specifying one or more trig-
ger types of interest. Allowing multiple trigger types is necessary because trigger-based 
behavior may depend on multiple trigger types. For instance, malware may be triggered 
by a combination of the system time and a keyword in keyboard inputs. By default, 
MineSweeper provides a list of typical trigger types commonly used in malware, including 
keyboard inputs, network inputs, the system clock, and other library and system calls 
used commonly in malware as triggers. In addition, MineSweeper is designed to be easily 
extensible and allows the user to add additional trigger types. For example, the user can 
specify any function call or system call as a trigger type. 
For each trigger type that the user defines, he needs to specify where in memory the 
trigger inputs will be stored so that the Mixed Execution Engine can properly assign 
symbolic variables during mixed execution. For example, if the user specifies the return 
values of a new function call as a trigger type, he needs to specify where the return 
values are stored, e.g.; in which registers, or the return memory structure of the call or 
call-by-reference pointers. In our running example, the specification would include that 
GetLocalTime is a trigger type. The specification would also include that GetLocalTime 
stores its results in a 16-byte structure pointed to by a stack value when GetLocalTime is 
called. During mixed execution, this information is used so that a call to GetLocal Time 
will result in a fresh symbolic variable for each byte returned. Such information is usually 
readily available in API documentation. 
If the user does not know what trigger type the malware may use, they can configure 
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MineSweeper to offer additional assistance. In this case, MineSweeper will monitor the 
program execution for possible inputs to the program, e.g., system calls and library calls. 
When a new input source is detected, MineSweeper prompts the user whether the input 
source should be considered a trigger type of interest. 
Symbolic Execution. After trigger types are specified, any inputs of these types will 
be marked as symbolic. Then we rely on TEMU to perform symbolic execution. That is, 
TEMU will explore all feasible paths that depend upon these trigger inputs, and solve the 
path predicate for each of these paths. 
3.4.3 Evaluation 
In order to test the effectiveness of our method, we have evaluated Mixed Execu-
tion Engine on real malware. Our real world examples include widely spread email worms 
(NetSky [44] and MyDoom [37]), DDoS tools (TFN [25]), and a keylogger (Perfect Keylog-
ger [67]). All of our experiments were performed on a 2.8Ghz Pentium dual-core processor 
with 4GB of RAM. Our experiments demonstrate that our techniques are capable of auto-
matically analyzing current real world malware examples. Our experiments also indicate 
that the total analysis time is quite small compared to an otherwise manual approach. 
Program Total Time STP Time Nodes #Trigger Jumps I Percent Sym. Insn. I 
My Doom 28 min 2.2 min 802042 11 0.00136% 
NetSky 9 min 0.3 min 119097 6 0.00040% 
Perfect Keylogger 2 min <0.1min 4592 2 0.00508% 
TFN 21 min 6.5 min 859759 14 0.00052% 
Table 3. 7: Analysis Results on Real-world Mal ware Samples using MineSweeper 
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Results Summary. Table 3.7 shows the results of our experiments. In this table, the 
"Total Time" column is the total end-to-end experiment time for MineSweeper to analyze 
each malware, i.e., the time to explore all conditional branches which depend on the 
trigger inputs. Note that MineSweeper is an unoptimized prototype, and that subsequent 
optimizations will likely bring the total time down. We break out the total time spent in 
STP. In our experiments, we spent about 13% time on average solving the path predicates. 
The "# Trigger Jumps" column counts how many conditional jumps were based on 
symbolic inputs. This number is important because it demonstrates that a relatively small 
number of branches need to be explored in order to uncover the trigger-based behavior in 
these experiments. 
We also show the percent of symbolic vs. number of concrete (x86) instructions ex-
ecuted. These numbers indicate that mixed execution reduces the formula a significant 
amount. This demonstrates that mixed execution is a promising approach. 
Below we discuss each experiment in more detail. 
NetSky Win32.NetSky is a Win32 worm that spreads via email. The NetSky worm was 
one of the most widely spread worms of 2004. NetSky is known to have time triggered 
functionality, however different variants trigger at different times. For example, the C 
variant is triggered on February 26, 2004 between 6am and 9am [31]. The D variant is 
triggered on March 2, 2004, when the hour is between 6am and Sam [44]. The NetSky 
binary we analyzed was packed to prevent static analysis. 
In our analysis, MineSweeper output that the library call GetLocal Time is a potential 
trigger type. We specified GetLocal Time as the trigger type, which returns a data struc-
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ture that contains fields for the current month, day, year, hour, and minute. MineSweeper 
then automatically explored NetSky and analyzed its trigger-based behavior. Figure 3.11 
shows a graph of program paths which depend on the trigger. In this graph, node 1 rep-
resents the day comparison, node 2 the month, node 3 the year, and nodes 4 through 6 
check the hour. As we can see, in order to generate an attack, the date must be February 
26, 2004, between 6-9am. According to the Symantec advisory, this is when NetSky.C 
attacks [31]. We can also see that when the time doesn't match, Netsky will loop back to 
the beginning and check again. 
Overall, MineSweeper was able to discover and uncover the trigger-based behavior in 
about 9 minutes. We verified that all known trigger-based behavior was discovered. 
true 
false 
Figure 3.11: NetSky's Trigger-based Behavior Extracted by MineSweeper. 
MyDoom Win32.MyDoom [37] is another mass-mailing email worm with a built-in 
denial-of-service time-bomb. Different variants have different trigger dates. All variants 
launch DDoS attacks, most commonly against www.microsoft.com and www.sco.com. Ad-
ditionally, most variants contain a termination date which causes them to stop propagat-
ing. The MyDoom binary we analyzed was packed. Overall, MineSweeper was able to 
discover and uncover the trigger-based behavior in MyDoom in about 28 minutes. We 
verified that all know trigger-based behavior was discovered. 
During the initial run MineSweeper output that the library call GetSystemTimeAsFiletime 
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was a potential trigger type. GetSystemTimeAsFiletime returns a structure which con-
tains two 32 bit integers representing the current date and time. After adding this speci-
fication, MineSweeper discovered MyDoom's behavior depends upon 11 different compar-
isons with the current date. MineSweeper automatically generated the path predicates, 
which STP solved. After solving these values, we were able to discover the termination 
date (Feb 12, 2004) as well as two DDoS dates (Feb 1 and 3, 2004). Feeding these values 
into the MineSweeper confirmed the DDoS. In addition, these values are confirmed by 
Symantec as the DDoS dates for MyDoom [37]. 
Perfect Keylogger Perfect Keylogger [67] is commercial software that has the ability 
to trigger itself based on window title (i.e. logging is activated and deactivated by the 
title of the window that is the target of the keystrokes). 
MineSweeper identified GetWindowTi tle as a possible trigger type. Once we added 
the trigger type specification, MineSweeper discovered that Perfect Keylogger checks if 
the current window name contains a pre-configured key string via the strstr library call. 
In our experiment, we found that MineSweeper branched heavily in the strstr call, e.g., 
checking if the first byte of the current window name was the same as the key's first byte, 
then checking if the second byte of the current window name was the same as the key's 
second byte, etc. In this scenario, MineSweeper continued to make progress, albeit very 
slowly. 
However, since strstr is a standard library function, we can be more efficient by 
replacing strstr calls with calls to a summary function. The summary function concisely 
summarizes the effects of strstr. Note that summary functions need only be defined once, 
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and can be reused when analyzing other examples, and that they are a widely adopted 
technique in programming language research [20, 101]. Once we added this summary 
function, MineSweeper was able to quickly discover the trigger value in about 2 minutes. 
We verified that all know trigger-based behavior was discovered. 
TFN: Tribe Flood Network TFN [25] is a distributed denial-of-service attack zombie. 
Zombies are often found in the wild where the inner workings are unknown, e.g., the zombie 
may respond only to unusual messages. In the case of TFN, communication is carried out 
over ICMP. Different versions of TFN use different maps from command values to actions. 
Our goal in this experiment is to determine network inputs that would cause TFN to 
exhibit these different actions. 
The original version of TFN that we located was Linux software. For our analysis, we 
have ported it to Windows since our current implementation is for Windows. Therefore, 
our version is not vanilla TFN, but it will still allow us to do the relevant analysis. 
MineSweeper initially output that a raw ICMP network socket was the trigger type. 
After adding the appropriate specification, MineSweeper was able to identify and expand 
14 conditional jumps that depend on network data. Using the solved formulas that we 
created, we were able to determine the various command values that this version of TFN 
would respond to. This complex data was easily generated in only 21 minutes using the 
MineSweeper system. 
Chapter 4 
Proactive Malware Detection 
In the scenario of proactive mal ware detection, we aim to generate a thorough detection 
policy in advance, in order to detect an entire class of attacks, even before a new attack 
breaks out. In this case, the object to be analyzed is the operating system to be protected. 
In particular, we consider how to automatically generate a hook detection policy, by 
analyzing a given operating system. 
4.1 Proactive Hook Detection: Background and Problem 
Statement 
In this section, we first motivate our work by discussing the new hooking technique 
and limitations of previous approaches. Then we clearly define the problem. 
4.1.1 Function Pointer Hooking: A New Hooking Technique 
Traditional malware installs hooks by changing either code regions or well-known data 
regions, such as SSDT, IAT, and IDT. These code and data regions are easy to locate 
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and verify and it is straightforward to detect hooks in these well-known data regions. In 
order to evade detection, attackers have started to place hooks in previously unknown data 
regions. In particular, attackers target the function pointers in data regions, especially 
those that reside in heaps or dynamically allocated memory pools. Since the operating 
system often needs to consult with function pointers to make control decisions, tampering 
with these function pointers result in persistent control flow modifications. 
A function pointer can be located in a data section statically allocated for a kernel 
module. Its offset from the module base address is fixed, so locating this function pointer in 
a statically allocated object is not difficult. However, many function pointers are located in 
dynamically allocated kernel objects. As a highly complex software system, the operating 
system maintains a large number of data structures, and many of them contain function 
pointers. For example, Windows maintains a linked list for registered network protocols, 
such as TCP /IP. Each node in this linked list keeps a set of function pointers for handling 
network-related events. For example, when an incoming TCP packet arrives, the OS 
kernel calls ReceiveHandler in the node for the TCPIP protocol. If malware tampers with 
this function pointer, it can sniff, drop and tamper with the incoming network packets 
arbitrarily. 
The advantages of this hooking technique for attackers are two-fold: (1) there are a 
large number of kernel objects in the OS kernel and many of these kernel objects have 
function pointers that can be exploited. If security researchers specifically defend a kernel 
object, malware authors can easily choose a new target for their attack; and (2) without 
in-depth knowledge about the OS kernel, we generally have no idea how to traverse these 
dynamically allocated kernel objects and verify the legitimacy of these function pointers. 
typedef struct { 
int type; 
char name[512]; 
} OBJ_HEAD; 
typedef struct { 
OBJ_HEAD head; 
LIST_ENTRY link; 
int (*open)(char *n, char *m); 
} FILE_OBJ; 
LIST_ENTRY ObjListHead; 
CreateFile () { 
FILE_OBJ *f = malloc(sizeof(FILE_OBJ)); 
InsertTailList(&f->link, &ObjListHead); 
} 
CreateDevice() { 
84 
typedef struct { 
OBJ_HEAD head; 
LIST_ENTRY link; 
int state; 
DEVICE_OBJ *d = malloc(sizeof(DEVICE_OBJ)); 
InsertTailList(&d->link, &ObjListHead); 
int (*ioctl)(char *buf, int size); } 
} DEVICE_OBJ; 
Figure 4.1: Code Snippet for a Polymorphic Linked List 
This semantic barrier poses less challenges to malware writers, because they only need 
to reverse engineer a small portion of the kernel data structures to make their attacks 
succeed. 
To further demonstrate the advantage of this hooking technique, we play on the at-
tacker's side. Without much effort, we have identified two function pointers in the key-
board driver to exploit and implemented two new attacks to sniff keystrokes. These two 
keyloggers can successfully evade all the existing hook detection tools, except ours. We 
will discuss more details about these two keyloggers in Section 4.4.1 and Section 4.4.3. 
4.1.2 Current Proactive Detection Techniques 
To proactively detect malware that exploits kernel data structures, several systems 
have been proposed recently [7, 62]. The basic approach for these systems is to thor-
oughly traverse kernel data structures, and verify the integrity of these data structures. 
SBCFI [62] verifies function pointers in these data structures using pre-defined policies, 
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whereas Gibraltar [7] infers invariants in the data structures and detects violations of 
the generated invariants. Therefore, besides detecting hooks, Gibraltar can also detect 
data-only attacks. However, these systems have limitations. 
In order to traverse kernel data structures, these two systems perform static source 
code analysis, by statically examining the kernel source code, extracting type information, 
constructing type graphs, and then generating traversal templates. However, static source 
code analysis has inherent limitations. First of all, requiring access to the source code 
would impede third-party security practitioners to deploy these schemes on closed-source 
operating systems like Windows. Of course, in some cases, the source code is available. 
For example, these schemes can be employed on open-source operating systems like Linux. 
For closed-source operating system, the OS vendors could be persuaded to provide the 
traversal templates by performing static source code analysis on their own. However, even 
in these cases, static source code analysis is imperfect. The OS kernel is usually written 
in weak-typed languages like C, and type information in the source code is inadequate for 
constructing complete type graphs. For example, "void *" pointers are defined pervasively 
in the source code and are cast into concrete types in specific execution contexts. Another 
example is LIST .ENTRY, which is frequently used to define a linked list. As shown in 
Figure 4.1, LIST .ENTRY is used to define the list head and included as a field in the objects 
linked in the list. To deal with insufficient type information, these schemes resort to 
manual annotation in the source code. The analysts need to have in-depth understanding 
of the source code, and determine the actual types of the objects that are pointed by "void 
*" and are linked by LIST .ENTRY. This manual process can be time-consuming, error-prone 
and incomplete. 
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More fundamentally, static source code analysis is unable to deal with type polymor-
phism. Figure 4.1 illustrates such a case. A linked list Obj ListHead stores objects of 
two different types, FILLDBJ and DEVICLOBJ. These two types share a common head 
structure OBJ_HEAD, while the remaining portions in these two types are different. As this 
linked list keeps two different types of objects, we cannot statically determine the actual 
type of this linked list. As a result, we will not locate and traverse the function pointers 
in these objects. This situation is not hypothetical. In the Windows kernel, many dif-
ferent types of kernel objects, such as files, devices, drivers, and processes, are managed 
in a centralized hash table [76]. These kernel objects keep important system states and 
function pointers. Thus, it becomes critical to traverse and verify the function pointers in 
these polymorphic data structures. 
4.1.3 Problem Statement 
In this paper, we aim to provide a proactive hook detection scheme. We will automat-
ically generate hook detection policy, which can be used on users' machines to thoroughly 
locate and validate the function pointers in the OS kernel. More importantly, we will 
overcome the limitation of static source code analysis employed by previous systems. 
Design Goals. We have the following design goals: 1) the access to the kernel source 
code is not required, such that our technique can be widely used for closed-source operating 
systems like Windows; 2) the challenges of analyzing polymorphic data structures should 
be addressed, such that function pointers in these polymorphic data structures can be 
validated; and 3) the generated hook detection policy should be machine-independent. 
87 
That is, the policy that is not bound to a specific machine. All machines that have the 
same version of OS kernel should be able to deploy our system and apply this policy. 
Assumptions. We assume that the malicious code is executed in the same privilege as 
the OS kernel, and it can read arbitrary memory location but can only write into writable 
data regions. To ensure the integrity of code regions and read-only data regions, we can 
resort to an existing defense scheme [36, 78]. 
Problem Scope. Since our goal is to thoroughly locate and validate function pointers, 
we consider the following attacks that do not directly modify function pointers to be out 
of scope: 
• Code and jump table patching. Malware may patch system code regions to 
make persistent control flow modifications (e.g., by placing a jmp instruction into 
a function entry). Malware may also modify a jump target in a jump table (e.g., 
in a switch statement) to result in a control flow attack. Since jump tables are 
usually located in read-only data regions or embedded in code regions, these two 
classes of attacks are implicitly addressed by ensuring the integrity of code regions 
and read-only data regions. 
• Data structure manipulation. Malware can make data-only modifications on 
kernel data structures to change the system's state and behaviors. A well-known 
attack is to hide a process by unlinking its entry from the active process list. This 
type of attack requires a more in-depth understanding of the OS kernel, and it is 
generally hard to implement illicit functionality by making data-only modifications 
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on kernel data structures. We do not address this class of attacks and leave it as 
future work. 
• Transient control flow attacks. Malware can change control flow temporarily 
by modifying a return address on the stack (like in a buffer overflow attack). The 
attack on a return address is transient, because the stack frame is destroyed after the 
function call has returned. As compared to persistent hooks, this kind of transient 
attacks is not as powerful. We are not aware of any existing rookits making use of 
this technique. So we do not consider this class of attacks in the paper. 
4.2 Approach Overview 
At a high level, our approach consists of two subsystems: analysis subsystem and 
detection subsystem. The analysis subsystem performs static and dynamic binary analysis 
on a given distribution of an operating system, and generates a policy for hook detection. 
The detection subsystem is deployed on users' machines with the same distribution of the 
operating system installed. The detection subsystem enforces the policy generated by the 
analysis subsystem and actively detects hooks at runtime. Note that the system protected 
by the detection subsystem does not need to be the same as the one analyzed by the 
analysis subsystem. These two systems only need to have the same set of binary modules. 
For instance, if the analysis subsystem generates a policy for Windows XP Professional 
SP2, then this policy can be used for hook detection on any machines with Windows XP 
Professional SP2 installed. Of course, when a new kernel update is released, we need to 
generate a corresponding policy for it. Since our system can generate the new policy in a 
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fully automatic manner within a few hours (as demonstrated in Section 4.4.2), we believe 
our approach is practical for wide deployment. In this section, we give a description of 
the analysis subsystem and the detection subsystem. 
4.2.1 Analysis Subsystem 
We perform whole-system dynamic binary analysis on the operating system for which 
we want to generate the hook detection policy. In other words, we run the entire instal-
lation of an operating system along with common applications, and observe how the OS 
kernel behaves. In particular, we are interested in the kernel's behaviors in two aspects: 
(1) because function pointers become the targets for installing hooks, we want to know 
how function pointers are created, distributed, and used; and (2) we want to monitor 
memory objects that are allocated either statically or dynamically. With the knowledge 
of these two aspects, we can have a complete view of the kernel memory space, in terms of 
where memory objects are and where function pointers are located within these memory 
objects. Such a complete view enables us to quantitatively and qualitatively assess the 
space and characteristics of kernel hooking attacks, and helps us determine appropriate 
detection policies. We will discuss more details about our quantitative assessment of the 
attack space in Section 4.3.1.1. 
Furthermore, we want to generate the hook detection policy by inferring invariants 
from this complete view (or more precisely, a series of views). In particular, we need to 
determine the layout of each memory object, in terms of where the function pointers are 
located within the memory object and what properties these function pointers have (e.g. 
whether they change over time). This process is essentially analogous to inferring the type 
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of a memory object. 
In order to address polymorphic data structures, we propose a context-sensitive anal-
ysis technique for inferring the policy. We take into consideration the execution context 
where each memory object is created. We rely on the fact that memory objects created in 
the same execution context are of the same or compatible types. That is, these memory 
object should have the same or compatible layouts. For the example in Figure 4.1, all the 
memory objects created in CreateFile are of type FILE_OBJ, and all the objects allocated 
in CreateDevice are of type DEVICE_OBJ. 
By tracking function pointers and monitoring memory objects, we are able to obtain 
the concrete layout for each memory object at a specific moment (i.e. exactly where the 
function pointers exist in an object). In order to locate and validate function pointers in 
the future, we need to extract a generalized layout for all the memory objects that are 
created in the same execution context. To this end, we devise a generalization process, 
which produces a generalized layout for a given execution context by merging concrete 
layouts of multiple memory objects created under that context. Such a generalized layout 
associated with the execution context is a context-sensitive template in our policy. As 
a result, the generated policy consists of a list of context-sensitive templates. We will 
explain the idea of policy generation in Section 4.3.1.2. 
4.2.2 Detection Subsystem 
To enforce the generated policy, the detection subsystem needs to be context-sensitive 
as well. That is, the detection subsystem monitors allocation and deallocation of memory 
objects, extracts the execution context when each memory object is created, and looks 
Analysis Subsystem 
D Monitor Engine 
TEMU 
Snapshots 
Function 
Pointers 
Figure 4.2: Architecture of HookScout 
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up the policy template corresponding to this execution context. Then according to the 
template associated with this memory object, the detection subsystem will periodically 
verify the validity of function pointers in this memory object. 
In contrast, previous approaches are context-insensitive. They traverse data structures 
from root variables, using the traversal templates derived from static analysis. Continuing 
with the example given in Figure 4.1, assuming they could statically determine the type 
of each node in the linked list, they would start with the head node ObjListHead, walk 
through each object in the list, and then uniformly verify each object, because they have 
to treat each object to be the same type. Our approach to this problem is different. 
We would monitor memory objects created by CreateFile and CreateDevice and check 
them individually. With the awareness of the individual execution contexts, we would be 
able to distinguish objects of different types, and treat them differently. We will discuss 
the detection subsystem in more detail in Section 4.3.2. 
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4.3 HookScout Design and Implementation 
To demonstrate the feasibility of our approach, we design and implement a system, 
called HookScout. We illustrate the architecture of HookScout in Figure 4.2. The analysis 
subsystem consists of two components: monitor engine and inference engine. The mon-
itor engine watches the behaviors of the operating system of interest. More specifically, 
it monitors memory objects that are created either statically or dynamically, and keeps 
track of function pointer propagating in the kernel memory space. We build the monitor 
engine on top of TEMU to perform this fine-grained dynamic binary analysis. During 
the dynamic analysis, the emulated operating system is exercised with common test cases, 
and the monitor engine periodically records system snapshots, including the state of mem-
ory objects and function pointers. Taking the snapshots as inputs, the inference engine 
performs context-sensitive analysis and generates the policy for hook detection. In the 
detection subsystem, the detection engine, located in the system to be protected, enforces 
the policy generated by the analysis subsystem and detects hook in the kernel space at 
runtime. In the rest of this section, we will describe each of these components. 
4.3.1 Analysis Subsystem 
In this section, we present the design and implementation of the monitor engine and 
inference engine respectively. 
4.3.1.1 Monitor Engine 
The monitor engine is responsible for: (1) monitoring memory objects; (2) tracking 
function pointers; and (3) periodically generating snapshots of the OS kernel. 
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Monitoring Memory Objects. The monitor engine watches memory objects that 
are allocated either statically or dynamically. A static memory object is a memory 
region statically allocated for a kernel module for storing global variables, while a dy-
namic memory object is allocated dynamically from heaps and memory pools. We in-
tercept several kernel functions in Windows for monitoring memory objects. We inter-
cept MmLoadSystemimage to obtain information about static memory objects, includ-
ing the module name, base address, and size. We intercept memory allocation and 
deallocation routines to monitor dynamically allocated memory objects. In Windows, 
RtlAllocateHeap and RtlFreeHeap are used for heap allocation and deallocation respec-
tively. Additionally, ExAllocatePoolWi thTag and ExFreePoolWi thTag are the root APis 
for allocating and freeing memory pools. Similarly, when a memory object is newly allo-
cated, we extract its base address and size and keep this information in the memory object 
state. We maintain the information for static and dynamic memory objects in an active 
memory object list. When a memory object is freed, we simply remove its information 
from the active memory object list. Some memory objects are special and are statically 
allocated and pointed by system registers. For example, IDTR is a register pointing to a 
static memory region for storing interrupt descriptor table and FS is a segment register 
pointing to a static memory region for storing the current execution context in Windows. 
Since these special static memory regions may contain function pointers, we also monitor 
these objects. 
For dynamically allocated memory objects, we also need to obtain the execution con-
texts when they are created. The execution contexts are later used by the inference engine 
to perform context-sensitive analysis and generate policy. We will describe more details 
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about obtaining the creation context in Section 4.3.1.2. 
'!racking Function Pointers. The monitor engine identifies where each function pointer 
is initialized and then keeps track of the function pointer as it propagates throughout the 
system. 
To identify the initial function pointers, we leverage the following fact: in modern 
operating systems, such as Windows and Linux, all the modules are designed to be relo-
catable. All references with absolute addresses to the statically allocated code and data 
sections for each kernel module have to be placed in the relocation table (e.g., . reloc for 
PE format). In this way, if the executable loader decides to load a kernel module into a 
different memory region than assumed, it can go through this relocation table to update 
these references. Note that even in a stripped binary module, this relocation table has to 
be present to support module relocation. Due to the fact that a function pointer refers 
to the absolute address of a function within a relocatable module, it must appear in the 
relocation table. Then to determine initial assignments of function pointers, we can check 
for each entry in the relocation table whether it points to a function entry. Function 
entries can be determined through standard static binary analysis. 
0005ed61: mov [ebp-50h], 00015141h 
For example, the instruction shown above moves a constant number into a memory 
location. The location (0005ed64h) of this constant appears in the relocation table and 
the actual value (00015141h) of this constant points to the entry point of a function. Then 
we can determine that this instruction copies a function pointer into a memory location 
on the stack. Dalton et al. used a similar approach to identify data and code pointers for 
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buffer overflow protection [22]. 
In our implementation, we develop an IDA Pro plugin to utilize the static binary 
analysis functionality provided by IDA Pro [48]. This plugin takes a kernel module as 
input, automatically enumerates the entries in the relocation table, identifies the function 
boundaries, and determines the locations of initial function pointers. By performing this 
analysis on all kernel modules, we have identified all the initial function pointers in the 
kernel. 
Then, to keep track of function pointers propagating over the system, we rely on the 
dynamic taint analysis functionality provided by TEMU. That is, we mark the initial 
function pointers as tainted, and during the execution of each instruction, if any source 
operand is tainted, we mark the destination operand is tainted by checking data depen-
dency between operands. In this way, we can track which data structures and locations 
these function pointers are copied into. We believe that tracking data dependency is suffi-
cient, because it is very unlikely for legitimate kernel code to propagate function pointers 
via implicit flows(e.g., control flow dependency and covert channels). 
Therefore, relying on the relocatable property of initial function pointers and dynamic 
taint analysis, we can identify the vast majority of function pointers (if not all) in the 
kernel memory space. 
4.3.1.2 Inference Engine 
The inference engine takes the system snapshots as input, performs context-sensitive 
analysis, and infers a policy for hook detection. 
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Determining Execution Context. In general, we want to know who creates a memory 
object. From the binary code point of view, this information can be obtained from the call 
stack when the memory allocation ,routine is invoked. From the call stack, we obtain the 
return address of the memory allocation function call. Considering that the function that 
invokes the memory allocation routine is called by another function, we actually obtain 
a chain of return addresses. Therefore, we define the execution context to be a chain of 
return addresses and the size to be allocated. Taking into account that kernel modules 
can be relocated to different locations in different executions and different systems, for 
each return address, instead of the absolute address, we keep the relative address - the 
offset to the base of the module where this return address is located. 
Note that the number of return addresses to be included determines the level of context 
sensitivity in our analysis. The more return addresses, the more context-sensitive our 
analysis is. For example, if function A and function B call function C, and function C 
allocates memory objects for A and B, the analysis with only one return address will 
think memory objects created in C are of the same type, which may not be true. In 
comparison, the analysis with two return addresses will treat memory allocated for function 
A and B differently. Hence, the increase of context sensitivity results in better analysis 
precision. However, the increase of context sensitivity also leads to more complexity in our 
analysis. First, it means that we need to perform more thorough test cases to cover more 
execution contexts. Second, it means the number of templates in the policy would increase 
drastically. Therefore, we need to determine an appropriate level of context sensitivity. 
Fortunately, as shown in Section 4.4.2, analysis with very small number (1 to 3) of return 
addresses can already generate high-quality policies with very high coverage and extremely 
low false positive rate. 
DATA 
I 
FP 
I 
CFP 
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NULL 
Figure 4.3: Lattice for Join Operation U 
u NULL CFP FP I DATA I 
NULL NULL CFP FP DATA 
CFP CFP CFP FP DATA 
FP FP FP FP DATA 
DATA DATA DATA DATA DATA 
Table 4.1: Matrix for Join operation U 
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Inferring Policy Templates. We merge the layouts of multiple dynamic memory ob-
jects with the same execution context into a generalized layout. Static memory objects are 
different because they are not associated with execution contexts so we uniquely identify 
them by their names (e.g., module names or register names). Thus, for static memory 
objects, we merge them according to their names. 
Within a memory object, we classify each field (e.g., 4-byte memory in 32-bit archi-
tecture) into one of the following types: NULL, FP, CFP, and DATA. NULL is for a field 
that holds a concrete value 0. FP identifies a function pointer, which we determine by 
checking if this field is tainted. CFP indicates a constant function pointer that has never 
changed its value in its lifetime. To determine a CFP, we check if this field is tainted in the 
current snapshot, and its concrete value remains unchanged in previous snapshots since 
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this field is initialized. Thus, CFP is a subset of FP. DATA specifies a field that holds a 
data value, which is not tainted and does not hold a concrete value 0. 
To merge a set of observed object layouts into a single generalized layout, we con-
servatively infer the most general type for each field, according to the ordering shown in 
Figure 4.3. In the order NULL, CFP, FP, and Data, each type covers more possibilities 
than the earlier ones, so we generalize to the most specific type that includes all observa-
tions. This generalization corresponds to the join operator U in a simple linearly-ordered 
lattice. A corresponding matrix for this join operation U is also shown in Table 4.1. For 
instance, if one type is DATA and the other is a function-pointer type FP or CFP, the 
field might contain either a function pointer or data. To be conservative, we mark it as 
DATA in the generalized layout. Similarly, if a function-pointer field was sometimes con-
stant and sometimes not constant, it is conservatively non-constant in the merged layout: 
CFP U FP = FP. We illustrate a concrete example how two memory objects are merged 
in Figure 4.4. 
Object A Object B Merged Object 
NULL DATA DATA 
CFP FP FP 
FP + DATA ___. DATA 
DATA DATA DATA 
NULL CFP CFP 
Figure 4.4: An example of Merging Two Layouts 
As we will show in Section 4.4.1, the vast majority of function pointers are constant. 
In other words, they never change during their whole lifetime. Thus, the generalized 
layouts can be directly used as a policy to detect hooks that make modifications on these 
constant function pointers. In the current implementation of HookScout, we employ this 
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simple policy. This policy does not protect non-constant function pointers. We leave it 
as our future work to investigate more sophisticated policies for protecting non-constant 
function pointers. Note that so far the generated policy is a raw policy, including all 
templates. For the final policy to be enforced on users' machines, we only need to include 
the templates that contain CFP fields, which is only a small portion of all templates, as 
shown in Section 4.4.2. 
4.3.2 Detection Subsystem 
The detection engine resides on a user's machine to detect violations of the hook 
detection policy generated by our analysis subsystem. We are aware that the detection 
engine can be implemented in at least two ways. First, it can be implemented as a kernel 
module inside the protected operating system. Second, it can be implemented inside a 
virtual machine monitor to detect attacks happening in a virtual machine. While the 
first approach is easy to implement and deploy, the second approach is more resilient to 
various attacks. In the current implementation of hookscout, we implement a proof-of-
concept detection engine as a kernel module, mainly for demonstrating the effectiveness 
of our approach. We realize that malware is able to subvert our detection component, like 
any other security products sitting in the same execution environment as malware. We 
leave a more secure implementation as future work. 
In the kernel module, we intercept the same set of kernel functions for monitoring 
memory objects, as those in the monitor engine. When a memory object is created, we 
extract its execution context and determine if there is a policy template associated with 
this execution context. If not, we skip this memory object. Otherwise, we fetch and save 
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the actual value for each function pointer in that object, after a configurable timeout (e.g., 
1 second). This timeout allows the content of a newly allocated object to be initialized. 
Then we periodically go through the active memory objects that are associated with policy 
templates, and check their function pointers and see if their current values differ from the 
saved values. A different value indicates a hooking attack. When a memory object is 
freed, we remove it from the active object list and destroy the saved values. 
As the kernel functions to be intercepted are not in the SSDT, SSDT hooking is not an 
option to hook these functions. Instead, we hot patch the entry of each of these functions. 
That is, we place a jmp instruction into the function entry, making the execution redirected 
into the detection engine. The kernel module is configured to be loaded at the earliest 
stage of boot time, in order to monitor the memory objects as early as possible. 
Note that HookScout can also be used for hook prevention. When detecting a hooking 
attack, HookScout can recover the original value for the attacked function pointer to 
prevent this attack. 
4.4 Experimental Evaluation 
This section presents our experimental evaluation results. In the experiments, we aim 
to evaluate our system in the following aspects. In Section 4.4.1, we quantitatively assess 
the attack space and characteristics of kernel-space hooking attacks. In Section 4.4.2, we 
evaluate the analysis subsystem of HookScout, with respect to the coverage rate and false 
positive rate of the generated policy, the influence of context sensitivity to the quality 
of the generated policy, and performance overhead. In Section 4.4.3, we evaluate the 
detection subsystem of HookScout, in terms of detecting real-world kernel rootkits, false 
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alarms, and performance overhead. 
Experimental Setup. Our experiments proceeded as follows. We first ran the analysis 
subsystem of HookScout to monitor and analyze a given operating system. To demonstrate 
that HookScout can work with closed-source operating systems, we chose Windows XP 
Professional Edition with Service Pack 2, a popular platform targeted by the majority of 
malware samples. During the analysis, we exercised the monitored operating system with 
a series of test cases that emulated common user behaviors, as listed in Table 4.2. 
Test Case Description 
1. Ping a remote host 
2. Recursively list a directory in command console 
3. Make a copy of the %SYSTEM32% directory 
4. Browse and search in Windows Explorer 
5. Edit and save a text file in notepad 
6. Visit several websites in IE 
7. Check network activities using netstat.exe 
8. Launch screen saver 
Table 4.2: Test Cases for Policy Generation in HookScout 
It took approximately 25 minutes to boot up the Windows XP inside QEMU with 
our monitor engine and execute the test cases. Meanwhile, the monitor engine recorded 
system snapshots every 15 seconds. The snapshot contains the states of memory objects 
and function pointers. Therefore, 100 snapshots were recorded for each run. In total, 
we performed 3 different runs, which rendered a total of 300 snapshots. Then on these 
snapshots, we assessed the attack space and characteristics, and generated policy for hook 
detection. 
We ran QEMU and the analysis subsystem of HookScout on a Linux machine with 
a dual-core 3.0GHz CPU and 4GB RAM. We ran a Windows XP Professional SP2 disk 
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image inside QEMU with 512M allocated memory. We installed the detection subsystem 
on a machine with a 3.0GHz CPU and 4GB RAM and Windows XP Professional SP2. 
4.4.1 Attack Space and Characteristics 
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25 
By monitoring system execution and tracking function pointers in the kernel, we are 
able to assess the attack surface and characteristics of potential kernel hooking attacks. 
First of all, we want to know how many function pointers exist in kernel space during 
the execution. This indicates the space of this attack vector. To explore this question, 
we picked the first run, and for each snapshot in that run, we counted the total number 
of function pointers in that snapshot1 . Figure 4.5 shows the total number of function 
pointers over the 25-minute execution. We can see that the total number of function 
pointers climbs up in the first 5 minutes of system boot-up, and then fluctuates around 
1 It should be noted that while we picked one run to show in Figure 4.5, all runs had similar character-
istics. 
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18, 000 during the execution of test cases. If every function pointer could be potentially 
exploited, the space of kernel hooking attacks is enormous. Figure 4.5 also shows the 
number of function pointers in dynamically allocated memory objects. Because these 
function pointers cannot be easily located and verified by traditional rootkit detection 
methods, they are more attractive to attackers. We can see that the number of function 
pointers in dynamically allocated memory objects is fairly high, around 8, 000. Therefore, 
there is a large attack surface for attackers to utilize in the OS kernel. 
Then, we want to know how long these function pointers live in the kernel space. Since 
we aim to detect persistent control flow modifications, attacks would target at long-lived 
function pointers instead of transient ones. Therefore, we want to know how many function 
pointers are long-lived. We used the last snapshot in the first run as a starting point, and 
looked backward at each of previous snapshots. If we see a function pointer exists in one 
snapshot but not in the snapshot before it, we treat this snapshot as the birth time of 
this function pointer. Figure 4.6 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the 
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function pointers' lifetime in the last snapshot of the first run. We can see that around 
10% function pointers only lived less than two minutes, and approximately 90% function 
pointers lived longer than 17 minutes, and very few lived in between. This observation is 
counter-intuitive to many who believe that most of data structures dynamically allocated 
on heap are transient and very few can be used for placing persistent hooks. 
Snapshots 
1 2 3 1 4 5 6 
Changed 597 629 617 609 612 614 
Total 18333 19640 19476 17188 16860 18642 
Ratio 3.26% 3.20% 3.17% 3.54% 3.63% 3.29% 
Table 4.3: Function Pointers That Have Ever Changed 
Moreover, we want to know how frequently these function pointers change their targets 
during the execution. The answer to this question helps us to define appropriate policies. 
If many function pointers change frequently, we have to define a sophisticated policy that 
determines a set of legitimate targets, and verify them as least as frequently as they change 
to point at different targets. Otherwise, if most of the function pointers remain constant 
during their whole lifetime, then a simple policy would suffice for verifying their integrity. 
That is, we can simply check if a function pointer has ever changed during its lifetime. To 
answer this question, we randomly chose 6 snapshots, and for each of function pointers in 
these snapshots, checked if its concrete value was different in any of previous snapshots 
during its lifetime. Table 4.3 shows the results for these 6 snapshots. As we can see, 
on average only 3.35% function pointers have ever changed during their lifetime. This 
observation indicates that a simply policy would suffice to validate the vast majority of 
function pointers. 
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Two Synthetic Keyloggers. To further assess the severity and practicality of function 
pointer hooking attack, we play on the attacker's side. We implemented keystroke sniff-
ing functionality by tampering with function pointers. We performed a combination of 
dynamic and static binary analyses to reverse engineer a small part of kernel code related 
to keystroke processing. We sent some keystrokes into the emulated system and collected 
an execution trace for the guest kernel. Through dynamic taint analysis, we tracked how 
keystrokes propagate in the kernel space. In consequence, we identified several code re-
gions that are relevant to keystroke processing. Then we use IDA Pro to perform static 
analysis on these identified code regions. It took one of the authors only a few hours 
to identify two function pointers (one in static memory region allocated in the keyboard 
driver i8042prt. sys, and the other in a dynamic memory region) that can be individu-
ally exploited to intercept keystrokes. To confirm that these two function pointers can be 
exploited indeed, we implemented two keyloggers, named keylogger-1 and keylogger-2, 
to exploit these two function pointer respectively. We are not aware that such attacks have 
appeared in the literature and existing malware attacks. As shown in Section 4.4.3, these 
two keyloggers evade the existing detection tools except HookScout. This experiment 
demonstrate that it is absolutely feasible for attackers to implement illicit functionalities 
by using this stealthy attack technique. 
Having concerns that attackers may take advantage of these two new attacks to evade 
the existing defense mechanisms, we choose not to disclose more details and keep these 
samples for in-lab purpose only. 
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4.4.2 Policy Generation 
Now we evaluate the analysis subsystem of HookScout. In particular, we are interested 
in how context sensitivity affects the quality of the generated policy. We measured the 
quality of the policy with two metrics: coverage and false positive rate. The coverage is 
measured as a ratio of the number of function pointers identified by the policy to the total 
number of function pointers. The false positive rate is measured as a ratio of the number 
of false FP fields 2 to the total number of FP fields in the policy templates. The false FP 
fields are those used to incorrectly locate and verify a function pointer, which in actuality 
is a data value. In addition, we want to see how context sensitivity affects the size of 
the generated policy. To measure coverage and false positive rate, we used the snapshots 
from the first two runs to generate policy, and then applied the generated policy to the 
snapshots from the third run. 
Level Coverage FP Rate Templates 
AVG SD AVG SD Raw Final 
1 94.67% 2.97% 0.015% 0.087% 3518 308 
2 96.10% 1.92% 0.015% 0.083% 4285 405 
3 96.74% 1.64% 0.014% 0.081% 5270 511 
Table 4.4: The quality and Size of Policy Influenced by Context Sensitivity. 
We listed the experimental results in Table 4.4. We measured the coverage and false 
positive rate for each snapshot in the third run. In Table 4.4, we summarized these 
results by calculating the average and standard deviation of the coverage and the false 
positive rate, respectively. For the size of the generated policy, we listed the number of 
templates in the raw policy and the number of templates in the final policy respectively. 
2 Here we count all fields with function pointers, including FP and CFP. 
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Sample Name Hooking Region IceSword VICE I RAIDE I HookScout 
HideProcessHookMDL [71] SSDT .( .( .( .( 
Sony Rootkit [81] SSDT .( .( .( .( 
Storm Worm [82] SSDT .( .( .( .( 
Shadow Walker [71] IDT ? .( .( .( 
basic_interrupL3 [71 J IDT ? .( .( .( 
TCPIRPHOOK [71] Tcp driver object X .( .( .( 
Rustock.C [73] Fastfat driver object X X .( .( 
Uay Backdoor [88] NDIS data block X X .( .( 
Keylogger-1 kbd driver data region X X X .( 
Keylogger-2 kbd driver data region X X X .( 
Table 4.5: HookScout's Detection Results on Real-world Malware 
We make the following observations: (1) the generated policies can achieve very high 
coverage and extremely low false positive rate, even with 1 level of context sensitivity; 
(2) with an increase of context sensitivity, coverage is increased and false positive rate is 
decreased accordingly; and (3) the size of policy (i.e. the number of templates) is increased 
considerably with the increase of context sensitivity, but the absolute number is still fairly 
small. 
Considering that 3-level context sensitivity can achieve the highest coverage and rea-
sonably small policy size, we chose to generate a policy with 3-level context sensitivity. 
It took approximately 70 seconds to process one snapshot, and around 4 hours in total 
to generate a policy from 200 snapshots. Due to the fact that we only need to generate 
one policy for each version of OS kernel and can distribute it to all machines with the 
same OS kernel installed, we believe that this execution time is acceptable. Moreover, the 
task of policy generation can be easily partitioned and parallelized, which would increase 
the performance significantly. 
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4.4.3 Hook Detection 
We evaluated three aspects of the detection subsystem of HookScout. First, we com-
piled a set of kernel rootkit samples to evaluate the effectiveness of the detection subsystem. 
Second, we measured its performance overhead. Third, we evaluated the occurrence of 
false alarms by performing new test cases that were not included in the policy generation 
phase. 
Detecting Kernel Hooks. We obtained a set of kernel rootkits from public resources [64, 
71] and collaborative researchers. We selected the rootkit samples that are known to install 
kernel hooks and are able to run in our test environment. Then we excluded the samples 
using the old hooking techniques that are not detected by the current implementation of 
HookScout, as discussed in Section 4.1.3. We also included the two synthetic keyloggers 
in the experiment to evaluate how effective the existing detection tools and HookScout 
are in terms of detecting new attacks. As a comparison with HookScout, we chose the fol-
lowing hook detection tools: IceS word [4 7], VICE [13], and RAIDE [70]. System Virginity 
Verifier [74] did not function correctly in our testing environment, so we did not include 
this tool in the experiment. 
We listed the detection results in Table 4.5. We can see that all detection tools, in-
cluding HookScout, are able to detect SSDT hooks, and all except IceSword are able to 
detect IDT hooks. IceSword displays only the content of IDT and requires manual in-
spection to determine if there is a hook. So we leave a "?" mark as the detection result 
of IceSword, in terms of detecting IDT hooks. TCPIRPHOOK [71] and Rustock.C [73] 
hook function pointers in device driver objects. More specifically, TCPIRPHOOK hooks 
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function pointers in the Tcp object and Rustock.C hooks in the Fastfat object. IceSword 
does not inspect kernel objects, and thus cannot detect these hooks. VICE and RAIDE 
have special polices to locate and verify some kernel objects. While RAIDE checks both 
Tcp and Fastfat, VICE only checks Fastfat object. Uay Backdoor [88] modifies func-
tion pointers in the NDIS data structure maintained for the TCP /IP network protocol. 
IceSword and VICE cannot detect these hooks installed by Uay Backdoor. However, 
RAIDE has another special policy for checking the registered network protocol list, and 
thus can detect these hooks successfully. By exploiting new function pointers, our two 
synthetic keyloggers, keylogger-1 and keylogger-2, can evade all the detection tools in our 
experiment, except HookScout. 
As compared to the other three detection tools, HookScout is able to detect all the 
samples in this set. The key difference between HookScout and the other tools is that 
HookScout is equipped with much more thorough detection policy, which is automatically 
generated by the analysis subsystem, whereas the other tools have very limited policies 
that are manually defined. Given the high coverage of our automatically generated policy, 
HookScout is substantially more difficult to evade. 
It is worth noting that TCPIRPHOOK, Rustock.C, and Keylogger-2 tamper with 
function pointers in kernel objects organized in the polymorphic hash table [76]. Even 
with access to the source code of Windows kernel, static source code analysis employed 
by SBCFI [62] and Gibraltar [7] would not identify these function pointers. By contrast, 
with context-sensitive policy inference and hook detection, HookScout can automatically 
generate policy and validate these function pointers successfully. 
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Performance Overhead. To observe how HookScout affects performance, we per-
formed several workloads and measured their execution times with and without the de-
tection engine installed. We also measured the performance with two different checking 
intervals: 1 and 5 seconds. The workloads include booting Windows, copying a directory 
structure, performing compression and decompression of a directory structure with 7zip, 
and downloading a file with wget. The total size of the directory structure is 75MB. The 
size of the downloaded file is 100MB. Table 4.6 shows the execution time for each work-
load. Each workload is performed 7 times and the average of 5 non-minimum/maximum 
runs is reported. In all, the slowdown caused by HookScout is about 4.9% and 2.1% for 
the checking intervals of 1 second and 5 seconds respectively. 
Workload jwo /w HookScout Slowdown 
HookScout Interval = 1s Interval = 5s Interval = 1s Interval = 5s 
Boot OS 19.43 s 20.70s 20.43 s 6.5% 5.1% 
Copy directories 7.57 s 8.09s 7.68 s 6.9% 1.5% 
(De) compress files 23.84 s 24.44s 23.51 s 2.5% -1.4% 
Download a file 23.59 s 24.49s 24.42 s 3.8% 3.5% 
Table 4.6: Performance Overhead of the HookScout's Detection Engine. 
False Alarms. When evaluating the performance overhead, we also measured the oc-
currences of false alarms. It is appropriate because the workloads used for performance 
evaluation is partially different from the ones used for policy generation. The number of 
false alarms is defined as the number of policy templates that are violated. We observed 
4 false alarms during the execution of these benign workloads. 
Note that the policy we used for hook detection was derived from 200 system snap-
shots. By including more snapshots into the policy generation, the false positive rate and 
occurrence of false alarms can be further reduced. In addition, we can manually adjust the 
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generated policy after we observe and confirm the false alarms. Actually, after we adjusted 
the policy, we did not observe more false alarms in the remaining runs of experiment. 
Chapter 5 
Limitations and Future Work 
Everything has limitations. So is the techniques proposed in this dissertation. In 
this chapter, we systematically discuss several limitations. Furthermore, we discuss some 
countermeasures and pointers to future research. 
5.1 Detecting, Evading and Subverting the Analysis Plat-
form 
Malware can detect the discrepancies between the emulated environment and real 
execution platform. After detecting the presence of our analysis platform, malware may 
choose to evade or subvert it. Some study shows the possibility of subverting the entire 
emulated environment by exploiting buffer overflows and integer bugs [65]. Therefore, we 
need to fix these bugs to prevent the subversion attacks. 
Mal ware can detect the presence of QEMU /TEMU in a variety of ways [30, 69]. First, 
malware can check the hardware characteristics. QEMU emulates a set of hardware de-
vices, some of which are unique. However, this detection vector will also catch virtual 
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machines that use the same set of hardware devices (such as Xen [100] and KVM [50]). 
Given that virtual machines are gaining more and more popularity on personal computers 
and production systems, this detection vector will not work effectively in practice. Second, 
malware can check the timing differences. This detection vector exploits the fact that an 
operation will take a different amount of time (most likely longer time) under emulation 
than on real hardware. Third, malware may target CPU instructions whose behaviors 
in an emulated system differ from their behaviors in real hardware. Martignoni et al. 
conducted automatic fuzzing test on numeric system emulators and showed that QEMU 
performs differently than real CPU on hundreds of unique test cases [55]. Each of them 
could be used to detect the presence of QEMU. 
To address the transparency issue, Dinaburg et al. proposed a malware analysis frame-
work, called Ether, which leverages hardware virtualization extension (e.g., Intel-VT and 
AMD-V) [24]. Ether effectively hides timing differences by factoring out extra time for 
analysis operations, and gets ride of CPU semantics differences by executing directly on 
native CPU. Therefore, Ether provides excellent transparency. However, hardware vir-
tualization does not offer a good foundation for fine-grained binary analysis. Although 
the single-step mode in CPU enables instruction-level instrumentation, its performance 
overhead is significantly higher than that of a system emulator (at least 5 times in our 
experiment). This is because in single-step mode, each instruction triggers a hardware 
interrupt. Moreover, emulators like QEMU break down each complex instruction into in-
termediate operations. Reasoning on these intermediate operations is substantially easier 
than directly on instructions. Unfortunately, Ether does not have this support. 
A promising approach to a transparent fine-grained extensible malware analysis plat-
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form would be combining emulator technique with hardware virtualization technique, for 
example by record and replay. That is, we can first run malware in a hardware-assisted 
virtual machine and record hardware inputs and other critical events. Then we replay 
these hardware inputs and events in a whole-system emulator to perform fine-grained 
malware analysis. Chow et al have demonstrated the feasibility of recording hardware 
inputs in VMWare and replaying these inputs in QEMU [17]. By literally replaying CPU 
tick counts, detecting timing differences are effectively eliminated. Detecting CPU se-
mantics differences can also be addressed by efficiently locating divergence points during 
replay. 
5.2 Limitations of Dynamic Analysis 
An open problem for dynamic analysis lies in its limited test coverage. Malware may 
evade detection and analysis by simply not performing malicious behavior during the 
dynamic analysis. It may stay inactive until certain conditions are satisfied. For example, 
time bombs activate themselves only on specific dates, and some keyloggers only record 
keystrokes for certain applications or windows. In Section 3.4, we address this problem 
by specifying certain inputs as symbolic, and automatically exploring multiple execution 
paths. Moser et al. also implemented a similar idea [57]. However, there are several 
limitations with this technique. First, we cannot predict all trigger conditions and mark 
them as symbolic. In practice, we only treat some common inputs as symbolic, such as 
system time, the availability of internet connection, the existence of certain registry keys, 
and filesystem and network inputs. If some malicious behaviors depend on certain trigger 
conditions that are not monitored, it is unlikely to disclose and analyze these malicious 
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behaviors. Second, this technique does not scale. The number of execution paths to be 
explored increases exponentially with the increase of symbolic inputs. Malware writer can 
exploit this limitation by making the control flow graph arbitrarily large and complex. In 
consequence, our analysis would run out of resources before reaching the actual malicious 
behaviors. 
Another problem is denial-of-service attacks to dynamic analysis, especially to fine-
grained dynamic analysis techniques discussed in this dissertation. Fine-grained dynamic 
analysis requires substantially more CPU and storage resources than native execution. 
Malware writers can exploit this fact to launch a denial-of-service attack. Embedded with 
expensive operations (such as time lock puzzles [27]), the malicious code can effectively 
render malware analysis systems to run out of resources and time. 
Solutions to these two problems will be interesting research topics. For example, we 
could significantly improve the performance of fine-grained analysis techniques by having 
better hardware support or better software optimization. 
5.3 Limitations of Taint Analysis 
In this dissertation, I take advantage of taint analysis technique to keep track of infor-
mation flow in a fine-grained manner. However, taint analysis is not a panacea. Conser-
vative taint analysis may lead to taint explosion, and attackers may evade taint analysis 
though implicit flows. How to address these two limitations will be important future work. 
Taint Explosion. Taint analysis is conservative in tracking data flow. In an arithmetic 
operation, if any byte of inputs is tainted, we mark all bytes of the output to be tainted. In 
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order to keep track of taint through conversion table lookups, we also extend taint analysis 
policy to propagate taint if the index for a memory read becomes tainted. As shown in 
Slowinska et al.'s study [80], this naive approach will leave to taint explosion very soon. In 
Panorama, we mitigate this taint explosion problem by using a heuristic policy: tainting 
through table lookups is only allowed up to a configurable number of times, starting from 
its taint source. The rationale behind this is that there are only a small number of table 
lookups (e.g., less than 3) for legitimate purposes. A tainted value derived through a 
large number of table lookups is unlikely to be strongly related to the taint source. In 
practice, we found this heuristic policy effectively mitigate taint explosion. However, it 
may introduce false negatives. Moreover, malicious code may exploit this policy to break 
taint analysis by introducing a large number of table lookups. 
Implicit Information Flow. Taint analysis keeps track of information propagating 
through direct data dependency. It is worth noting that information may also propagate 
through other channels, such as control flow dependency. This situation does not happen 
very often in benign program, but a malicious program could exploit implicit information 
flow to conceal the fact that sensitive information is leaked. Researchers have proposed to 
extend taint analysis to track control flow dependency by computing control flow graph 
and tainting outputs between the predominator and the postdominator [28]. This scheme 
does not solve this problem successfully for two reasons. First, it does not track the 
outputs generated in unvisited paths between the predominator and the postdominator. 
The attackers can construct some code snippet to propagate information through these 
unvisited paths. Thus, this scheme is incomplete. Second, this extension can become 
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another major factor for taint explosion. 
Chapter 6 
Related Work 
6.1 Dynamic Binary Analysis Platform 
Tools like DynamoRIO [26], Pin [52], and Valgrind [59] support fine-grained instru-
mentation of a user-level program. They all provide a well-defined interface for users 
to implement plugins. However, as they can only instrument a single user-level process, 
they are not suitable to analyze the operating system kernel and applications that involve 
multiple processes. In addition, these tools resides in the same execution environment 
with the program under instrumentation. Some of them even share the same memory 
space with the program under instrumentation, and change memory layout. In conse-
quence, the analysis result may be affected. In contrast, TEMU provides a whole-system 
view, enabling analysis of the OS kernel and multiple processes. Moreover, as it resides 
completely out of the analyzed execution environment, TEMU can provide more faithful 
analysis results. 
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6.2 Layered Annotative Execution 
In this dissertation, we proposed a generic binary analysis technique, called layered 
annotative execution, which is a superset of dirty flag analysis, dynamic taint analysis and 
symbolic execution. 
Dynamic Taint Analysis. Dynamic taint analysis has been applied to solve and an-
alyze other security related problems. Many systems [21, 61, 68, 83] detect exploits by 
tracking the data from untrusted sources such as the network being misused to alter the 
control flow. Chow et al. made use of whole-system dynamic taint analysis to analyze how 
sensitive data are handled in operating systems and large programs [18]. The major anal-
ysis was conducted in Linux, with source code support of the kernel and the applications. 
Egele et al. also utilized whole-system dynamic taint analysis to examine BHO-based spy-
ware behavior [28]. Vogt et al. extended the JaveScript engine with dynamic taint analysis 
to prevent cross-site scripting attacks [96]. Our system is independently developed with 
OS-aware analysis for closed-source operating systems, and devises a unified machinery 
for detecting malware from several different categories. 
Symbolic Execution. Symbolic execution was first proposed by King in 1976 [49]. 
Since then it has been used in many different settings, including automatic test case 
generation [39, 77, 102], vulnerability-based signature generation [12], sound replay of ap-
plication dialog [60], and program verification [32, 33]. 
EXE and DART both use symbolic execution to find bugs in program source code [15, 
39] while we perform symbolic execution on binaries. Engineering symbolic execution for 
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binaries is quite different than for source code. For example, we must deal with symbolic 
memory writes and reads, which in source code is equivalent to reasoning about loading 
and storing pointers from collections such as arrays. Another difference includes the lack of 
abstractions: while source code has complex types, procedures, and variable scoping which 
can be used as hints for mixed execution, binaries have only simply types, no functions, 
only globally addressed memory region and registers. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
In this dissertation, we sought to capture the intrinsic natures in malicious behaviors, 
in order to build more effective automatic malware detection and analysis systems. Mal-
ware analysis is likely the most challenging problem in binary code analysis. To address 
the common challenges, we proposed a new architecture for binary analysis, and imple-
mented a unified and extensible analysis platform, called TEMU. We proposed a core 
technique, namely layered annotative execution, as a Swiss army knife for fine-grained 
dynamic binary analysis, and implemented this technique in TEMU. Then on the ba-
sis of TEMU, we proposed and built a series of novel techniques for automatic malware 
detection and analysis. For postmortem malware analysis, we have developed Renovo, 
Panorama, HookFinder, and MineSweeper, for detecting and analyzing various aspects 
of malware. For proactive malware detection, we have built HookScout as a proactive 
hook detection system. After evaluating our techniques with a large volume of real-world 
malware samples, we believe that our techniques are effective and practical. Moreover, 
since these techniques capture intrinsic characteristics of malware, they are well suited for 
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dealing with new malware samples and attack mechanisms. 
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